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Abstract
This article investigates the microeconomics underlying the spectacular growth of productivity in
China’s manufacturing sector over the period 1998–2007. Underlying the aggregate evidence of such
dramatic growth, one observes a large, albeit shrinking, intra-sectoral heterogeneity coupled with an
even more important process of learning and knowledge accumulation. A major process of both
catching-up and dying out among the least efficient ones occurs. Furthermore, we explore the effect
of the characteristics of firms according to the ownership and governance structure upon the product-
ivity distributions, highlighting the importance of the transformation of domestic firms as drivers of
technical learning. In essence, China’s fast catching-up process entails more of learning and “creative
restructuring” of domestic firms rather than sheer “creative destruction” and even less so a multina-
tional corporation-led drive.
JEL classification: O1, O3, O4
1. Introduction
This article analyzes the microeconomics of the spectacular productivity growth in manufacturing in China over the
period 1998–2007, disentangling the contribution of the various types of organizational carriers, distinguished
according to their institutional characteristics, related to ownership and governance structures (e.g. State-owned, for-
eign multinational corporations [MNCs], private-owned). Exploiting a unique firm-level database, we investigate the
micro evidence on the dynamic of labor productivity distributions across and within groups underlying the revealed
dramatic increase of China’s productivity in manufacturing.
The first major question we address regards the micro statistical properties of the process of industrial develop-
ment. How diverse are the degrees of technological efficiency across firms within each industrial sector? And how do
they change throughout the development process? In doing that, we study the relative importance as drivers of
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productivity growth of (i) idiosyncratic, firm-specific learning (the so-called within effect), (ii) competitive selection
among incumbents (the so-called between effect), and (iii) entry and exit.
Second, we focus on the institutional “Identity Cards” of the firms involved. Who are the major drivers of the
catching-up dynamics? Domestic firms? Foreign direct investments? And among the formers, what is the relative role
of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), public–private partnerships, and greenfield private firms?
Concerning the empirical evidence, an extremely robust feature emerging from our study is the high degree of het-
erogeneity in production efficiency at all levels of sectoral disaggregation. This is indeed a striking aspect of the devel-
opment process but also a persistent one of “mature” industrial dynamics. However, the support of the labor
productivity distributions shrinks over time. The degree of productivity dispersion among low-productivity firms
diminishes, while that of high-productivity ones increases slightly, reflecting both catching-up by the former and a
forging-ahead some of the latter.
Indeed, the dynamics in the support of productivity distributions and especially in the left tail is not just the
sheer effect of market selection, but also the outcome of deeply rooted patterns of firm-level learning and institu-
tional changes within the corporate sector. The contribution to productivity growth of various types of firms sig-
nificantly changes over time. To analyze it, we compare labor productivity distributions and their dynamics across
six major ownership types: State-owned, collective-owned, foreign-invested, shareholding, and domestic private
enterprises.
In general, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) enter with a relatively high productivity, but their contributions
change relatively little thereafter. Conversely, all other types of firms display a pronounced change in both the mean
and the support of the productivity distribution, showing learning and “catching-up,” particularly during the period
of the deepening of institutional reforms. The transformations of State-owned, “shareholding” (public–private joint
ventures [JVs]), and private enterprises significantly affect the decreasing dispersion of labor productivity especially
among the less-efficient firms, but also contribute to the fattening of upper echelon. Moreover, a (small) group of pri-
vate enterprises also contributes to catching-up to the technology-frontier but to a relatively lower degree and mostly
in “lower tech” sectors.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the incumbent literature on China’s in-
dustrial productivity. Section 3 briefly depicts the changing institutional context from 1978 to 2007. Section 4 intro-
duces China’s micro manufacturing data set. Next, Section 5 discusses the broad microeconomic picture underlying
the striking overall productivity growth. Section 6 analyzes the micro-evidence on labor productivity at sectional
level in terms of levels and growth. Finally, Section 7 investigates the properties of such distributions and their dy-
namics across different ownership categories. Section 8 concludes.
2. China’s contemporary growth
China’s GDP per capita increased from 524 in 1980 to 5239 dollars in 2007 (PPP constant price and exchange rate,
2005 dollars, cf. The World Bank, 1997). Productivity growth was a major driver of overall economic growth, as
also indicated by several recent growth accounting exercises (Bosworth and Collins, 2008; Zheng et al., 2009; Brandt
and Zhu, 2010).
With respect to the aggregate evidence, Young (2003) estimates that labor productivity growth has been 2.6%
per year between 1978 and 1998, for the non-agriculture sector. For the manufacturing sector, Szirmai et al. (2005)
and Wang and Szirmai (2008) estimate a growth of 2.3% between 1980 and 1990, and 15.9% per year during the
period 1990–2002, witnessing a rapid and accelerating process of catch up.
Brandt et al. (2012)—on the grounds of longitudinal data set rather similar to the one used below—finds an im-
pressive growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) of 7.7% yearly in manufacturing over the period 1998–2006.1
There are several policy and institutional drivers of the productivity performance of Chinese manufacturing,
many of which we can only telegraphically mention here. They include the reform of SOEs; industrial policies affect-
ing investment, innovation, finance, and trade; competition policies; and the expansion of private companies. (For a
thorough discussion, whose spirit we broadly share, see Dahlman, 2009.) The end-result of the foregoing policies
and institutional changes yielded contributions to productivity growth which have been significantly different among
1 Notwithstanding the limitation of such measure of productivity (for a more detailed discussion cf. Dosi and Grazzi, 2006).
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different types of enterprises and across different periods. Such differences are also at the center of the analysis that
follows.
In the early stage of reform, Goodhart and Xu (1996) show that township and village enterprises (TVEs) were the
main engine of Chinese productivity growth during early 1990s, although starting from very low levels. Jefferson and
Rawski (1994) estimate that the annual growth rates of labor productivity of TVEs were the highest between 1980
and 1992, and conversely in the State sector it was the lowest. More precisely, the growth in the State sector fluctu-
ated between 3.8% and 6.3% during the period 1978–1992, peaking in the years 1984–1988, while the productivity
of TVEs grew at 5.8% between 1980 and 1984, then increased to 14.4% (1984–1988) and to 17.7% (1988–1992).
In late 1990s, Deng et al. (2005) estimate annual labor productivity growth at 20.4% between 1995 and 2003, ac-
cording to a large firm-level databank of industrial large and medium enterprises, with a major contribution stem-
ming from the conversion of SOEs to “shareholding” ones (Jefferson and Su, 2006): see below.
Wang and Szirmai (2008) decompose the overall labor productivity growth in terms of sectors and forms of own-
ership. Interestingly, in the 80s changes in the sectoral composition of output, i.e. structural change, bear an import-
ant contribution to aggregate industrial productivity growth, while, as we shall see, this is not any longer the case in
the subsequent period, when firm restructuring is the main driving force. Together, shifts in the weights of ownership
categories account a substantial part of productivity growth during the productivity boom in 1990s, with the expand-
ing foreign-invested category (MNCs and JVs) taking up a good deal of the shift.
The literature on the micro-evidence on China’s productivity and industrial dynamics (cf. Jefferson et al., 2008) finds
a paramount contribution to productivity growth seemingly by exiting and entering firms, even if entering led with
restructuring by incumbents. Moreover, the literature highlights the importance of ownership on the average efficiency
of Chinese industrial firms, with FIEs exhibiting the highest, and SOEs exhibiting the lowest, efficiency levels.
Along similar lines, Dougherty et al. (2007) in the period 1998–2003 show an overall higher productivity of pri-
vate firms. Irrespectively of the ownership, and irrespectively of the criteria of measurements, the performance is
truly impressive. So, for example, Fu and Gong (2011) try to estimate TFP and find that the latter appears to grow at
an average of 4.8% over the period 2001–2005. However, as informative as means and their dynamics are, they hide
profound and long-lasting differences across individual firms.
Indeed, there is an emerging tradition of analysis of the microeconomics behind aggregate means and dynamics,
pointing at the stylized fact concerning large and persistent heterogeneity in productivity among firms even within
the same narrowly defined industries (see the evidence and reviews in Nelson, 1981; Geroski, 1998, 2002;
Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Ahn, 2001; Foster et al., 2001, 2008; Dosi, 2007; Dosi and Nelson, 2010; Syverson,
2011; Dosi et al., 2012). While this literature mostly focuses on developed countries, micro-heterogeneity applies,
even more so, to emerging economies. Note that such persistent heterogeneities bear far-reaching implications for
any analysis of industrial evolution and development more generally. First, and straightforwardly, any dynamic ana-
lysis ought to concentrate upon the shape of the distributions of whatever firm characteristics and their dynamics
over time. Second, one ought to address the drivers of such dynamics. Third (an often neglected point), ample and
persistent heterogeneity in the input/output relation at any time renders analyses in terms of “production function”
and TFP, quite dubious or even deeply biased.2 On that we offer some evidence below supporting our choice using
labor productivities (even if for the skeptical reader we present some TFP estimates in the Appendix).3
Moreover, firms differ also in their ownership, forms of governance, and origins. This will be the other focus of
our study. The longitudinal data below will help indeed in highlighting the movements of sector-specific and organ-
ization-specific productivity distributions among firms, that is the very microeconomic action behind the dynamics
of the observed means.4
2 The point is well argued in Hulten (2001) and sophistications do not alter the basic property that if, micro production
functions are not identical up to a scalar the TFP estimates are basically meaningless. This adds to even deeper flaws
in the production function construct itself [more in Dosi and Grazzi (2006), and earlier in Pasinetti (1959), Fisher (1971),
Shaikh (1974) among many nowadays neglected others].
3 For a recent work on China using our same data trying to estimate the allocative distortions stemming from inter-firm
heterogeneity in a production function framework, see Hsieh and Klenow, 2009.
4 A large literature on transition economies, whose acknowledgment is here beyond search is interested into impact of
firms’ institutional setups upon performances. For an early, similarly micro-castered analysis, cf. Brada et al. (1997).
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However, before looking of the details of the data, it is useful to place the transformation of the Chinese industry
against the background of at least equally profound institutional and policy changes.
3. The changing institutional context
Unlike the “big bang” transformation of the economy systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China has
adopted the “gradualist approach” of economic reform. The reforms which occurred within China’s industrial sector
since 1978, occurred at three different levels, namely (i) reforms concerning SOEs, (ii) the political economy of non-
State sector, and (iii) the “opening up” policy, and in three temporal stages (Qian, 2000, 2002; Zou, 2008).
The first stage (1978–1992) featured the transfer of SOEs’ power of control and governance without touching
issues of property rights, the stated aim being “putting plan and market on equal footing” (Qian, 2000). The period
up to the early 1990s corresponded to distributions of labour productivities generally displaying an efficiency lead of
FIEs.5 Interestingly, JVs in quite a few sectors display “best-performers” more efficient than “best-performers” of
MNCs (evidence available by the authors upon request).
In the second period (1993–2003) of institutional change, the focus of SOEs reform shifted to corporate govern-
ance, and the adjustment in their product portfolios.
The first strategy was to establish a “modern corporate system,” involving the transformation of SOEs into mod-
ern enterprises with clear property rights, well-defined responsibility and authority, separation of enterprises from
the government, and professional internal management (Qian, 1996).
The second policy step was meant to streamline SOEs output structure, highlighted by the slogan “retain the large
while release the small.” The central government defined five groups of sectors kept under the control of the State, i.e.
national security sectors, natural monopolies, sectors providing public goods or services, strategic natural resources, and
key enterprises in “pillar” and high-tech sectors.6 Note that, since most SOEs were in net loss until 1997, the transition
of large and medium SOEs to some “market discipline” involved deep and often socially painful reforms.7
The third step involved the “shareholding system” and the development of a “mixed ownership economy” within
large SOEs. This meant transforming SOE in proper shareholder-owned firms possibly involving also private, domes-
tic, and foreign investors, yielding an ensemble of “shareholding firms” characterized by mixed ownership. In 1994,
thousands of SOEs were selected to conduct such an experiment. Among them, 540 (23%) were transformed into
mixed shareholding enterprises (SHEs); 909 (38.8%) turned into companies having the State as the only shareholder;
the rest did not implement changes in corporate governance and ownership (Zou, 2008). In 1999, the shareholding
system was promoted over all large and medium SOEs, with the State maintaining ultimate control rights over the
large/strategic SOEs.
A crucial property of the whole process has been the deep transformation but not the destruction of the techno-
logical capabilities embodied in incumbent SOEs (a more articulated discussion of the transformation of SOEs in the
80s in Groves et al., 1994).
Thereafter, in the period 1998–2002 “the State retreats and the private sector moves forward” has been the main
strategy, which was designed according to the timetable of China’s WTO accession. SOEs were withdrawn from so-
called “competitive” sectors, while have been strengthened in “pillar” industries. Together, a major employment
shake-out took place (Cao et al., 1999): the number of workers employed in State-owned manufacturing enterprises
fell from 35 million in 1992 to 9.8 million in 2002, with most of the decline in late 1990s (NBS, 2003). The restruc-
turing and consolidation of large and medium SOEs were mainly conducted by merger with domestic or foreign
firms, conglomeration, and initial public offering on the stock market (Cao et al., 1999). Overall the background ex-
amples and inspiring objectives of these policies were the Japanese Keiretsu and the Korean Chaebol. Large State-
controlled enterprises were and are mainly in resource-based, capital-intensive, and high-tech industries, such as
coal, steel, oil, petrochemicals, aluminum, ship-building, and industrial machinery which all qualify for government
“preferential policies” (Brandt et al., 2008).
5 Here and throughout we treat MNCs and JVs within the same broad category.
6 Government designated five “pillar” industries: machinery, electronics, petrochemicals, automobiles, and infrastructure
construction (The World Bank, 1997).
7 Through workers layoff, merger and reorganization, separation of social corporate-paid services, debt-to-equity swap,
etc.: the goal was achieved roughly by the year 2000.
568 X. Yu et al.
 at Scuola Superiore Sant?A
nna on N
ovem
ber 29, 2016
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
At the same time a significant process of privatization of small SOEs and COEs at the county level took place,
involving between 50% and 70% of small SOEs, dependent on the provinces. In cities, privatization has occurred in
two waves and peaked after 2000 (Garnaut et al., 2006). During the first wave, in mid-1990s, more than half of the
firms were privatized in three forms, namely, sale to a private domestic or foreign firm; transformation into a limited
liability or joint stock company; and “stock cooperatives” which are essentially employee/manager ownership with
some features of cooperatives (Cao et al., 1999). The second wave occurred around 1997, with management buyouts
as the most frequent mode.
At the same time, a huge amount of private firms have entered the market, particularly into “competitive sectors,”
i.e. sectors outside the “pillar industries.” The output share of domestic private enterprises increased from 3% in
1995 to 22% in 2004 (Wang, 2009).
Prior to WTO membership, during the negotiations in the 1990s, China has gradually liberalized trade and FDI
regimes (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008). Huang (2003) highlights three patterns in FDI inflows into China and in the
corresponding strategies of MNCs. Early on, a significant portion of FDI inflow into China originated from small
and medium enterprises typically from China’s neighboring regions—Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan—and operat-
ing relatively simple and labor-intensive production and assembly processes. Conversely, investments by large
Western and Japanese MNCs constituted only a small portion of total FDI flows. Moreover, the former were the
drivers of China’s export-processing regime in the 1990s, yielding an increasing share of export in GDP from around
12% in 1990 to 20% in 2000. Second, joint-ventures typically involved foreign firms and SOEs and were explicitly
aimed at the acquisition of advanced technologies. Third, the share of wholly foreign owned enterprise relative to
equity JVs increases from mid-1990s, due to the gradual enforcement of the Trade-Related Investment Measures
linked with WTO accession.
Interestingly, foreign multinationals and JVs most often aim their production primarily to China’s domestic mar-
ket. In 2002, within the 10 industries with the highest share of FDI (accounting for around half of the output), two-
thirds of their sales went to the domestic market (Brandt et al., 2008). Moreover, the composition of the origin of
FDI has shifted from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regions to Western countries and Japan. At the same time,
MNCs’ investments increasingly favored what Pavitt (1984) calls “scale-intensive sectors” (from automobiles to
chemicals), “specialized suppliers” (such as machinery), and ICT.
In the third period (2004–) reform of the governance of SOEs went ahead, involving a higher liquidity of their
shares and a greater separation between government and corporate management.
Possibly more interesting for the interpretation of the evidence that we shall present below, during this most re-
cent period, in “pillar” industries, and especially the “scale-intensive” ones, SOEs and JVs kept a central role, not-
withstanding some entering attempts by private domestic firms. And they indeed display a considerable dynamism in
terms of technology acquisition and productivity growth. This is a dynamism which is shared across manufacturing
by a good deal of private firms (especially in relative low-tech industries). Indeed, as we shall see in detail below the
period witnesses the strengthening of the role of domestic firms of all types in the process of catching-up.
4. Data
The raw data set includes all industrial firms with sales above 5 million RMB covering period 1998–2007.8 This data
set comes from annual surveys of the “above-scale” industrial enterprises conducted by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China.9
Out of that, we extracted manufacturing-only firms,10 and we cleaned the data in order to eliminate visible re-
cording errors, yielding what we call “China Micro Manufacturing” (CMM).11
8 Year 2004 is a census year and firm’s value added of this year is not available in the data set, and thus, we do not use
the 2004 survey in this article.
9 Industry is defined to include mining, manufacturing, and public utilities, according to NBS. Five million RMB is approxi-
mately US$ 600,000.
10 Manufacturing firms are those with Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) code between 13 and 43.
11 We drop firms with missing, zero, or negative value-added; and also firms with a number of employees less than 8,
since below that threshold they operate under another legal system (Brandt et al., 2012). NBS has modified its
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Table 1 shows the number of observations. Finally, we built a balanced CMM including only the firms that are in
the sample for all years (Thus, excluding all firms dropping out at any point and all firms entering after the first year
of the sample.) just to give an idea of the intensity of “churning” occurring over the period. The persistent firms are
25,557, that is 18.9% of the total in 1998 and 8.3% in 2007.
Here, we use the definition of “capital stock” originally provided by the data set, that is the sum of all vintages of
capital still in use recorded at the nominal cost of the investments.
This work focuses on dynamics of labor productivity, measured as constant-price value added per employee,
which we understand as a very plausible proxy of efficiency in different sectors (more on that below).12 When appro-
priate, in the analysis we shall use relative productivities (normalized with sectoral averages).
piðtÞ ¼ logPiðtÞ < log PiðtÞ > (1)
with Pi ¼ VAiNi ; < logPiðtÞ >
P
i2sectorjlog PiðtÞ
njðtÞ , PiðtÞ labor productivity, VAiðtÞ real value added, Ni(t) number of
employees, of firm i at year t; nj(t) number of firms in sector j at year t.
13
We further disaggregate firms by ownership and governance structures. According to the firm’s registration sta-
tus, we classify firms into seven ownership categories: SOEs; collective-owned enterprises (COEs), Hong Kong,
Macao, and Taiwan-invested enterprises (HMTs); FIEs, including in turn foreign MNCs (FMNC), and JVs with a
foreign share above 25%, SHEs; private-owned enterprises (POEs); and other domestic enterprises. As shown in
Table 2, 23 registration categories have been aggregated into 7 larger ones, in line with the approach of Jefferson
et al. (2003). Below, however, due to numerosity, we analyze only the first six categories.
Each firm is classified into a sector according to the four-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) that resem-
bles the old US SIC system.14
5. A striking productivity growth: the general picture
Table 3 shows the annual growth rate of labor productivity of incumbent firms during different subperiods in the
CMM database, highlighting the dramatic growth of productivity in China’s manufacturing. The overall productivity
of incumbents grew at 9.98% during 1998–2007. All sectors display positive productivity growth rates, except pet-
roleum refining, which had negative growth during the 1998–2002 period.
Table 1. Number of firms in original and modified data sets, respectively
Year Number of obs (original data set) Number of obs (CMM sample) Deleted obs
1998 148,664 135,510 13,145 (9.70)
1999 146,078 134,004 12,074 (9.01)
2000 147,249 136,830 10,419 (7.61)
2001 155,665 147,612 8053 (5.46)
2002 165,801 157,015 8786 (5.60)
2003 181,013 174,932 6081 (3.48)
2005 250,975 243,906 7069 (2.90)
2006 278,667 271,726 6941 (2.55)
2007 312,304 306,327 5977 (1.95)
Note: Numbers in the brackets denote percentages of deleted observations with respect to original data set.
Source: Raw data set and CMM.
industrial classification after 2002. The data set used in this article has adjusted the industrial classification before
2003 into the new standard. Since CIC43 has emerged merely after 2002, we do not consider it here.
12 We undertook the same analysis in terms of TFP.
13 Value-added is deflated by four-digit sectoral output deflators, from Brandt et al. (2012).
14 In 2003, the classification system was revised to make room for further disaggregation for some sectors, while some
other sectors were merged. To make the industry codes comparable across the entire period, we follow Brandt et al.
(2012) which has constructed a harmonized classification. Our CMM data set spans over 29 two-digit sectors, 161
three-digit sectors, and 424 four-digit sectors.
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Further, note the remarkable differences in productivity growth across sectors, as such circumstantial evidence of
significant inter-sectoral differences in absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) of “frontier,” generally for-
eign, technologies, and of corresponding differences in the average catching-up rates.
Figure 1 offers three snapshots of the non-parametric kernel density distributions of labor productivity, together
with the comparison with the corresponding Italian and French ones, as a vivid illustration of the overall technology
gaps with two higher income countries.15
At a first glance the readers might find such a comparison as somewhat far-fetched if one has in mind of a “would
production function,” possibly multiplied by some country-specific scalar. After all, Chinese wages have been/are at
least an order of magnitude lower than Italian and French ones. As a consequence, one would expect to see the three
countries on very different positions on such production functions. But is it really the case? If it were so, one would
also expect, first, major differences between China, on the one hand, and Italy and France, on the other, in capital/
output ratios—the appropriate proxy for “capital intensities” when “production functions” differ. And of course one
should expect strong correlations between labor productivities and capital/labor ratios within each country and
within each sector.16 Premise to the following: the proxies for “capital” are very noisy on Italian and French data
and just more so on Chinese ones!
Remarkably, what the evidence suggests is rather at odds with the conventional wisdom. First, capital/output
ratios also at sectoral levels do not differ very much between China and the two considered European countries (cf.
Table A1): indeed they tend to be higher in China! Second, the within-country, within-sector micro correlations be-
tween labor productivities (VA/L) and capital/output ratios (K/VA), for whatever proxy for K is used, is robustly
Table 2. Aggregation of the 23 registration categories
Code Ownership category Code Registration status
1 State-owned 110 State-owned enterprises
141 State-owned jointly operated enterprises
151 Wholly State-owned companies
2 Collective-owned 120 Collective-owned enterprises
130 Shareholding cooperatives
142 Collective jointly operated enterprises
3 Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan-invested 210 Overseas joint ventures
220 Overseas cooperatives
230 Overseas wholly-owned enterprises
240 Overseas shareholding limited companies
4 Foreign-invested 310 Foreign joint ventures
Joint ventures 320 Foreign cooperatives
340 Foreign shareholding limited companies
Foreign MNCs 330 Foreign wholly-owned enterprises
5 Shareholding 159 Other limited liability companies
160 Shareholding limited companies
6 Private 171 Private wholly-owned enterprises
172 Private cooperatives enterprises
173 Private limited liability companies
174 Private shareholding companies
7 Other domestic (not included) 143 State-collective jointly operated enterprises
149 Other jointly operated enterprises
190 Other enterprises
Source: Jefferson et al. (2003), Annex I.
15 Referees, compared to an earlier version, have asked us to add PPP estimates, of course, PPPs should not matter
when estimating outputs of firms on sectors, but the profession is so inspired by an idea that the whole world is a gen-
eral equilibrium that they probably thought that PPPs would change the picture, of course, it does not!
16 For intriguing historical evidence on this point, see Allen (2012).
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negative in China (cf. Table A2) and is mildly negative in Italy and France (statistics available upon request). Putting
it another way, labor and capital productivity are strongly positively correlated. Together, third, even within China,
labor productivities and capital/labor ratios—as such a proxy of degrees of production mechanization/automation—
are basically orthogonal (see Figure 2 for an illustration of a sector out of most).
Overall, the evidence suggests that very little action comes from “moving along isoquants” in response to relative
prices.17 Rather, “best practice” techniques involve a more efficient use of both labor and capital, and relatedly,
catching-up fundamentally involves improvements on both dimensions. It is a world of complementarities rather
than substitution, wherein technology-gaps and learning efforts are both captured by labor productivity differences,
quite independently from relative prices, which TFP proxies might well yield a quite distorted picture of the develop-
ment process. Indeed, given the inverse relation between labor productivities and capital/output ratios, labor produc-
tivities alone turn out to be a robust proxy for the lower bound of “true” efficiency distributions within countries,
but also across countries, with the added advantage of avoiding any explicit or implicit hypotheses on interfactor sub-
stitutability and capital measurements.
Table 3. Annual growth rate of labor productivity over 1998–2007, and subperiods 1998–2002 and 2002–2007 among
“continuing” firms (i.e. firms keeping in the same two-digit sector over the relevant period)
CIC Sector 1998–2007 1998–2002 2002–2007
13 Food processing of agricultural products 11.25 8.55 13.46
14 Other foodstuff 8.87 5.73 11.22
15 Beverages 10.63 6.20 12.80
16 Tobacco 15.29 11.08 10.65
17 Textile 9.79 10.14 10.54
18 Garments, footwear etc. 7.84 4.84 10.57
19 Leather, fur, feather etc. 7.55 6.52 10.29
20 Processing of timber, manuf. of wood, bamboo etc. 11.87 7.61 14.43
21 Furniture 6.19 4.82 10.40
22 Paper and paper products 10.33 9.48 11.75
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 8.92 7.54 8.17
24 Articles for culture, education and sports 8.39 7.06 10.03
25 Processing of petroleum, cokeries, nuclear fuel 3.77 1.61 6.36
26 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 11.40 10.44 11.85
27 Pharmaceuticals 8.94 10.64 7.53
28 Chemical fibers 10.31 12.05 8.85
29 Rubber 8.80 7.01 9.39
30 Plastics 5.83 6.43 6.24
31 Non-metallic mineral products 12.76 9.86 14.71
32 Smelting and processing of ferrous metals 13.86 12.68 14.14
33 Smelting and processing of non-ferrous metals 12.45 13.73 12.64
34 Metal products 5.44 7.84 4.32
35 General purpose machinery 15.40 13.76 15.72
36 Special purpose machinery 16.23 13.09 15.13
37 Transport equipment 12.67 11.64 13.05
39 Electrical machinery and equipment 9.51 8.84 9.32
40 Communication equipments, computers etc. 5.64 8.37 3.30
41 Measuring instruments and machinery 9.62 9.46 9.57
42 Artwork and other 10.01 9.32 12.70
Average 9.98 8.73 10.66
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
17 In fact the empirical elasticities of substitutions implied by the negative micro relation between labor productivities
and capital/output ratios (i.e. positive correlations between labor and capital productivities) are positive in sign:
“isoquants” do not look like the standard isoquants but are more similar to rays out of the origin.
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Granted all that, let us now focus on the micro picture which the data offer and its dynamics. Start noting the dif-
ferent upper bounds of the three country distributions, as such an impressionistic proxy of different inter-country
lags and leads (together of course with different sectoral compositions of output). Second, the width of the support of
the distribution of China is much larger, revealing much greater technological asymmetries across Chinese firms.
The dynamics of catching-up in China’s manufacturing productivity is indeed associated with (i) a rightward move-
ment of the mean of the distributions; (ii) a corresponding rightward movement of the support; and (iii) as we shall
analyze in more detail below, a shrinking of the support itself. Labor productivity distribution is asymmetric and left-
skewed. The evolving pattern of the left-tail and that of the right-tail are different as well, as the magnitude of left-tail
shift toward higher levels of productivity is very significant, compared with a relatively mild movement of right-tail.
Such dynamics matches what in the old development literature was called a “reduction of the dualistic structure
economy” composed by a shrinking traditional/relatively backward part of manufacturing and an expanding
“modern” one, which however is only just beginning to push “frontier technologies” further.
An important piece of evidence on intra-sectoral asymmetries in efficiency and their changes over time is the top
to bottom ratio of labor productivities. Table 4 displays the ratio of the 9th decile over the 2nd decile for each sector
from 1998 to 2007. The ratios decrease in most of the sectors, indicating a reduction of productivity dispersion,
plausibly due both to learning by laggard firms and selection (exit) of worse performers. The ratios are generally
lower in “traditional” ones (CIC 17–24 including textile, garments, leather, furniture, paper manufacturing, etc.)
and higher in relatively technology-intensive sectors (e.g. transport equipment, electrical machinery, and communica-
tion equipment). The ratios drop more rapidly in the first part of the period under consideration which is also a
period of retreat of SOEs from the so-called “competitive sectors.” At the same time, the ratios in quite a few “heavy
industries” such as petroleum refining, and non-ferrous metals sectors grows, hinting at some sort of persistent “dual-
ism” within such industries (note that growing intra-sectoral asymmetries can and often go hand-in-hand with high
average growth rates).
How much of the dynamics in overall productivity distribution is due to inter-sectoral relocation of production?
Table 5 displays the time series of value-added shares of each two-digit sector in overall manufacturing. It is remark-
able that relatively little structural change has occurred over the period under investigation. So, for example, the
−2 0 2 4 6 8
−
5
0
5
10
ln(K/L)
ln
(V
A/
L)
CIC 131(1998)
Figure 2. Scatterplot of log(V A/L) versus log(K/L) for Corn milling sector (CIC 131), year 1998. OLS regression: Coefficient ¼ 0.038
(Standard error 0.029), R2¼ 0.0006, number of observations¼ 2838. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
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shares of transport equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, and communication equipment, computers etc.
are amongst the highest from the start of the period under consideration, and their total share just increases from
20.7% in 1998 to 22.5% in 2007. A sign indeed that China achieves quite early a “modern” industrial structure.
Interestingly, this evidence seems to contradict Kuznets’s view of increasing productivity due to structural change,
i.e. movements from low-productivity sectors to high-productivity ones also within manufacturing. On the contrary,
our evidence suggests that, unlike what happened in the 1980s (cf. Wang and Szirmai, 2008), the movement of the
overall manufacturing means is mainly due to sector-specific dynamics.
Of course, the relative stability of sectoral shares at two-digit sectoral level, does not rule out much more turbulence
at finer levels of disaggregation within each two-digit sector: indeed, there is very intensive “micro structural change.”
However, the evidence marks a difference with other episodes of industrialization and catching-up, in that China ap-
pears to be from the period of our observation already quite mature in terms of broad manufacturing structure. For ex-
ample, when South Korea had the same real per capita income that China had in 1998, which was 1973 (Maddison’s
historical statistics www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm), it had a share of around 22% of textile and clothing over
total manufacturing (World Development Indicators database), compared to a 1998 Chinese share of 12%.
In the literature a quite common claim is that export and productivity growth go together (possibly with causality
running in both directions). China does indeed display a dramatic rise in the share of export in total manufacturing
output and coupled with a dramatic growth in productivity. However the latter is not associated with an increased
frequency of exporting firms over the total; on the contrary, after a mild surge, the former’s share in manufacturing
Table 4. Ratio of the average labor productivity of the second highest decile over the second lowest one
CIC Sector 1998 2002 2007
13 Food processing of agricultural products 15.62 11.35 10.02
14 Other Foodstuff 19.12 12.20 9.04
15 Beverages 14.89 11.82 9.06
16 Tobacco 17.05 22.95 26.44
17 Textile 8.61 7.01 6.07
18 Garments, footwear etc. 6.51 5.45 5.42
19 Leather, fur, feather etc. 7.80 7.17 6.80
20 Processing of timber, manuf. of wood, bamboo etc. 11.25 6.91 6.51
21 Furniture 9.29 7.15 6.93
22 Paper and paper products 7.44 6.16 6.27
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 12.47 9.49 6.12
24 Articles for culture, education and sports 6.91 6.10 5.52
25 Processing of petroleum, cokeries, nuclear fuel 8.82 12.26 11.23
26 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 10.30 9.19 8.42
27 Pharmaceuticals 10.65 9.71 8.96
28 Chemical fibers 10.05 6.87 7.98
29 Rubber 6.56 7.49 7.42
30 Plastics 8.65 7.18 7.02
31 Non-metallic mineral products 8.32 7.91 8.23
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 9.57 8.58 8.40
33 Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 9.70 8.43 12.72
34 Metal products 8.36 7.21 7.12
35 General purpose machinery 8.77 6.68 6.56
36 Special purpose machinery 12.24 9.59 7.25
37 Transport equipment 11.69 8.19 7.09
39 Electrical machinery and equipment 9.39 7.71 8.24
40 Communication equipment, computers etc. 13.52 11.08 8.36
41 Measuring instruments and machinery 12.38 9.00 8.70
42 Artwork and other 8.88 7.38 6.59
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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value added significantly falls (Figure 3). In fact, the final share in 2007 (48%) is lower than that at the beginning in
1998 (51%).
Figure 4 shows the labor productivity distributions of exporters and non-exporters for the years 1998 and 2007,
in some selected sectors (chemical, electrical machinery, and communication equipment) which well illustrate a more
general pattern. Note that in 1998 exporters have higher level of productivity and their support of distribution is nar-
rower than that of non-exporters. However, a significant catch-up of non-exporters takes place, so that in 2007, ex-
porters and non-exporters have similar productivity distributions and similar widths of support. (We refrain on
purpose from making any causality statement.)
5.1 Learning vs. selection
An interesting assessment of the relative contribution to aggregate productivity growth arising from the reallocation
of market shares between incumbents and the entry and exit of firms is provided by the decomposition method intro-
duced by Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
The aggregate labor productivity of sector I at time t is denoted by equation
Y
I;t
¼
X
i2I
si;tpi;t (2)
where si,t and pi,t represent the employment share and labor productivity of firm i within two-digit sector I.
The variation of sectoral productivity can be decomposed into five components, of which the sum of
Table 5. Contribution of each two-digit sector to the total value added of manufacturing (percentages)
CIC Sector 1998 2002 2007
13 Food processing of agricultural products 4.74 4.50 4.96
14 Other Foodstuff 2.07 1.99 1.99
15 Beverages 3.51 2.69 2.01
16 Tobacco 5.70 5.13 3.11
17 Textile 6.39 5.81 5.23
18 Garments, footwear etc. 3.02 2.76 2.41
19 Leather, fur, feather etc. 1.78 1.76 1.58
20 Processing of timber, manuf. of wood, bamboo etc. 0.82 0.86 1.16
21 Furniture 0.50 0.53 0.69
22 Paper and paper products 2.11 2.17 1.86
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 1.21 1.11 0.74
24 Articles for culture, education and sports 0.92 0.77 0.60
25 Processing of petroleum, cokeries, nuclear fuel 3.56 3.79 3.52
26 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 7.18 6.96 7.78
27 Pharmaceuticals 2.95 3.29 2.45
28 Chemical fibers 1.19 0.91 0.86
29 Rubber 1.33 1.12 1.02
30 Plastics 2.35 2.47 2.28
31 Non-metallic mineral products 6.03 5.20 5.18
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 6.47 6.92 9.52
33 Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 2.08 2.24 4.58
34 Metal products 2.98 2.86 3.21
35 General purpose machinery 4.75 4.51 5.46
36 Special purpose machinery 3.33 3.09 3.25
37 Transport equipment 7.41 8.54 7.54
39 Electrical machinery and equipment 5.94 6.12 6.47
40 Communication equipment, computers etc. 7.39 9.64 8.44
41 Measuring instruments and machinery 1.25 1.23 1.24
42 Artwork and other 1.05 0.99 0.86
Total 100 100 100
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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the first three terms are the contribution of continuing firms, and the last two, of entering an exiting firms,
respectively.
DPI;t ¼
X
i2C
si;t1Dpi;tþ
X
i2C
ðpi;t1 PI;t1ÞDsi;tþ
X
i2C
pi;tDsi;t
þ
X
i2N
si;tðpi;t PI;t1Þ
þ
X
i2X
si;t1ðpi;t1 PI;t1Þ:
(3)
The first term represents the within effect, i.e. within firm productivity changes weighted by initial labor shares.
This term reflects productivity growth arising from the improvement of the productivity of installed production cap-
acity (due to process of learning at firm level). The second term is a between effect—changing labor shares weighted
by the deviation of initial firm productivity and initial industry productivity. This term reflects the contribution to
productivity growth from the reallocation of market share from less productive to more productive firms (and vice
versa). The third term is an interaction effect, capturing the covariations between firm productivities and shares. The
fourth term represents the entry effect—a sum of a year-end labor share weighted deviation of productivity of enter-
ing firms and initial industry productivity. Finally, the fifth term is an exit effect—a sum of an initial-year labor share
weighted difference between initial productivity of exiting firms and initial industry productivity.18
Given the high rates of input and output reallocations between incumbents, and via entry and exits, it is of great
importance to investigate the contribution of micro dynamics to aggregate productivity growth. Tables A3 and A4 re-
port the decomposition results for the whole manufacturing and for each two-digit sector using firm-level data set.
The within effect, i.e. intra-firm productivity growth, accounted for the largest proportion of manufacturing prod-
uctivity growth (see the last rows of the tables), that is 47% (1998–2002) and 57% (2002–2007). Net entry, i.e. the
overall effect of genuine entry and exit, also explained a substantial amount of growth: 19% (1998–2002) and 34%
Figure 3. Annual percentage contribution of exporters and non-exporters to value added of manufacturing. Source: our elaboration
on CMM.
18 Notice that, the between-firm, entry, and exit terms use the deviation between firm productivity and the industry aver-
age in the initial period. A continuously operating firm with an increasing share makes a positive contribution to aggre-
gate productivity only if it initially has higher productivity than the industry average. Entering (exiting) firms contribute
only if they have higher (lower) productivity than the initial average. This treatment of births and deaths ensures that
the contribution to the aggregate does not arise because the entering firms are larger than exiting firms, but because
of productivity differences.
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(2002–2007). At a finer level of disaggregation, within and net entry effects are the most important contributing
factors to sectoral-level productivity growth (as also shown by Figure 5 displaying the relative contribution of for-
mula 3). Remarkably, this property holds invariantly across all sectors. Such evidence sheds light on the prominence
of both firm’s idiosyncratic learning and “churning” via entry and exit. Conversely, the “between” effect contributed
to a smaller fraction of sectoral-productivity growth. Note that the major role of the within effect and the positive
contribution of net entry (and especially of its exit component) is a quite robust property of industrial dynamics also
in developed countries: for a survey, see Foster et al. (2001).
6. The dynamics of labor productivity distributions
Let us now focus on the detailed properties of productivity distributions and their dynamics.
The nonparametric kernel densities (Figure 1) provide a general appreciation of the evolutionary patterns of labor
productivity distributions. In order to account in more detail for such distributions and their dynamics, we resort to a
family of theoretical distributions, Asymmetric Exponential Power (AEP) ones (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2011), which en-
ables to properly account for the asymmetries and leptokurtosis of the distributions themselves.19
Note that by estimating an Exponential Power (EP) distribution, one implicitly undertakes robust maximum like-
lihood-based comparison of different distribution: indeed for a tail parameter b¼ 2 on both tails of the distribution
approximate a log-normal and for b¼ 1 a symmetric Laplace (exponential) one (more details in Bottazzi and Secchi,
2011).20
6.1 A striking intra-sectoral heterogeneity
Let us study the behavior of normalized (log) labor productivity at a two-digit sectoral level.21 We begin with the
analysis of the unbalanced panel, thus investigating the overall properties of the evolving population of Chinese man-
ufacturing firms, including entrants and exiters. Later we shall compare our results with the balanced panels of in-
cumbents throughout our observation period.
Figure 6 displays the binned probability density, AEP fitted distribution22 and, for sake of illustration, the
Normal fit of normalized (log) labor productivity for selected sectors in years 1998, 2003, and 2007. Over all sectors,
AEP estimates display significant deviations from (log-)Normal distributions, and even more so on the low-product-
ivity side.
First, the width of the support of both empirical distributions and AEP fit is much larger than that implied by a
Normal distribution with a good deal of the deviation due to the wide support of less-efficient firms.
Second, distributions are leptokurtic, with a very fat left tail. Figure 6 presents some sectoral examples while
Tables 6 and 7 provide the MLE estimates of the AEP parameters.
Scale parameters al and ar, capturing the left and right width of the support of AEP distributions, are shown in
Table 6. In contrast with the properties of mature economies (see on Italy Dosi et al. (2012)23) for the majority of sec-
tors, al monotonically decreases over time, indicating a shrinking process of the left-tail: this offers another
19 As discussion in Bottazzi and Secchi (2011) the AEP distribution is characterized by 5 parameters, two positive shape
parameters bl and br, describing the tail behavior in the upper and lower tail, respectively, two positive scale param-
eters al and ar, measuring the width of left and right tail, respectively, and one mode parameter m. AEP density is
fAEP x;pð Þ ¼ 1
C
e
 1
bl
jxmal j
bl hðmxÞþ 1
br
jxmar j
brhðxmÞ
 
(4)
where p¼ (bl , br , al , ar , m), h(x) is the Heaviside theta function and where the normalization constant reads
C¼ al A0 (bl)þ ar A0 (br), with AkðxÞ ¼ xkþ1x 1Cðkþ1x Þ. The AEP reduces to the Exponential Power distribution
(Subbotin, 1923) when al¼ ar and bl¼ br. Notice that the smaller the b’s, the fatter the tails.
20 As such, the exercise is of a different kind from estimates of e.g. a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test concerning the diversity
of two data-generating processes. Here we try to differentiate families of such processes.
21 For example evidence on distributions, see Bottazzi et al. (2002), Bottazzi and Secchi (2003), and Dosi and Grazzi (2006).
22 The five parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood method (MLE) following Bottazzi and Secchi (2011).
23 which finds a quite high stability of al and ar over time.
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circumstantial piece of evidence that labor productivities of less efficient firms tend to regress over time toward the
mean. On the contrary, for the majority of sectors, their ar increases over time, indicating that the labor productiv-
ities of more-efficient firms gradually diverge: indicating that some “frontier firms” forge ahead. Overall the support
of sectoral labor productivity distributions shrinks over time for most sectors, except a few capital- and scale-
intensive industries such as chemical fibers, rubber, nonmetallic mineral products, and nonferrous metals (CIC 25,
28, 29, 31, and 33).
Tail parameters bl and br of the AEP distributions are shown in Table 7. The values of bl are all around one, con-
firming the Laplace-type fat-tail property of the left-side distributions. Conversely, the values of br are not too far
from 2, hinting at a near log-normality of the upper tail. In fact br in quite a few sector is bigger than 2: the “best
practice” frontiers are quite steep.
Next, we split the whole panel among incumbents (firms which persist throughout our window of observation);
“genuine entrants” (firms that are actually born in the year when one starts observing them), “entrant in the panel”
(i.e. firms that were born before but only in a particular year enter the panel by overcoming the minimum sale
Table 6. (Unbalanced panel) Estimated al, ar parameters and standard errors (in parentheses) for the distribution of labor
productivities, two-digit CIC sectors
Unbalanced panel
al ar
CIC 1998 2002 2007 1998 2002 2007
13 1.24 (0.03) 1.04 (0.02) 0.88 (0.02) 1.39 (0.05) 1.29 (0.04) 1.35 (0.03)
14 1.59 (0.07) 1.11 (0.04) 0.74 (0.03) 1.04 (0.07) 1.28 (0.06) 1.34 (0.05)
15 1.38 (0.06) 1.13 (0.04) 0.75 (0.03) 1.00 (0.07) 1.11 (0.06) 1.35 (0.05)
16 1.39 (0.31) 1.14 (0.24) 0.40 (0.12) 1.31 (0.38) 1.90 (0.37) 3.50 (0.29)
17 0.91 (0.02) 0.75 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 1.07 (0.03) 1.08 (0.02) 1.20 (0.01)
18 0.70 (0.02) 0.61 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 1.06 (0.03) 0.92 (0.02) 1.03 (0.02)
19 0.79 (0.03) 0.63 (0.02) 0.40 (0.01) 1.13 (0.04) 1.21 (0.03) 1.29 (0.02)
20 1.09 (0.04) 0.74 (0.03) 0.54 (0.02) 1.16 (0.07) 1.11 (0.04) 1.26 (0.03)
21 1.07 (0.07) 0.80 (0.03) 0.45 (0.02) 0.91 (0.08) 1.06 (0.06) 1.43 (0.03)
22 0.98 (0.03) 0.73 (0.02) 0.56 (0.01) 0.82 (0.04) 0.98 (0.03) 1.20 (0.02)
23 1.13 (0.06) 1.06 (0.04) 0.53 (0.02) 1.22 (0.07) 0.97 (0.05) 1.12 (0.03)
24 0.68 (0.03) 0.66 (0.03) 0.54 (0.02) 1.21 (0.05) 1.03 (0.05) 0.96 (0.03)
25 0.84 (0.06) 0.74 (0.05) 0.81 (0.04) 1.26 (0.10) 1.65 (0.09) 1.47 (0.07)
26 1.03 (0.02) 0.87 (0.02) 0.76 (0.01) 1.11 (0.03) 1.23 (0.03) 1.23 (0.02)
27 1.01 (0.05) 0.96 (0.04) 0.80 (0.04) 1.14 (0.06) 1.17 (0.05) 1.31 (0.06)
28 1.11 (0.11) 0.80 (0.06) 0.63 (0.05) 0.93 (0.13) 0.96 (0.08) 1.49 (0.08)
29 0.75 (0.03) 0.79 (0.04) 0.57 (0.03) 1.08 (0.05) 1.10 (0.06) 1.34 (0.05)
30 0.89 (0.03) 0.73 (0.02) 0.48 (0.01) 1.13 (0.04) 1.14 (0.03) 1.38 (0.02)
31 0.79 (0.01) 0.74 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 1.22 (0.02) 1.24 (0.02) 1.35 (0.02)
32 0.95 (0.03) 0.92 (0.03) 0.84 (0.03) 1.14 (0.05) 1.07 (0.05) 1.13 (0.04)
33 0.86 (0.03) 0.85 (0.04) 0.62 (0.02) 1.42 (0.06) 1.13 (0.06) 1.94 (0.04)
34 0.85 (0.02) 0.68 (0.01) 0.46 (0.01) 1.15 (0.03) 1.22 (0.02) 1.39 (0.02)
35 0.96 (0.02) 0.75 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 1.02 (0.03) 1.01 (0.02) 1.30 (0.01)
36 1.13 (0.04) 1.00 (0.02) 0.54 (0.01) 1.16 (0.05) 1.05 (0.04) 1.37 (0.02)
37 1.08 (0.03) 0.83 (0.02) 0.50 (0.01) 1.12 (0.04) 1.07 (0.03) 1.34 (0.02)
39 0.90 (0.02) 0.73 (0.02) 0.53 (0.01) 1.25 (0.04) 1.27 (0.03) 1.46 (0.02)
40 0.98 (0.03) 0.81 (0.02) 0.54 (0.01) 1.50 (0.05) 1.41 (0.04) 1.41 (0.02)
41 1.03 (0.05) 0.78 (0.03) 0.48 (0.02) 1.25 (0.07) 1.31 (0.05) 1.66 (0.03)
42 0.90 (0.05) 0.78 (0.03) 0.49 (0.02) 1.13 (0.07) 1.00 (0.04) 1.16 (0.03)
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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threshold), exiters (firms which die or are acquired), “others” (firms which for whatever reason fail to report in some
years). Table 8 reports the frequencies of each type.24
Let us begin by comparing the foregoing properties of the distributions with those displayed by the balanced panel
alone, comprising only the firms that are in the sample for all years.25 Basically the comparison between the two en-
sembles of distributions flags out the distinct impact on the evolution of the productivities of firms’ populations in
each sector of entry and exit processes.
Tables 9 and 10 show the maximum likelihood estimators of AEP distributions for each two-digit sector.26 The
evidence shows a remarkable pairwise similarity between the distributions. In particular, the tails (proxied by the bl
Table 7. (Unbalanced Panel) Estimated bl, br parameters and standard errors (in parentheses) for the distribution of labour
productivities, two-digit CIC sectors
UNBALANCED PANEL
bl br
CIC 1998 2002 2007 1998 2002 2007
13 1.18 (0.04) 1.02 (0.03) 1.27 (0.04) 2.47 (0.11) 2.36 (0.09) 2.41 (0.07)
14 1.45 (0.07) 1.09 (0.05) 1.20 (0.06) 1.74 (0.14) 2.19 (0.14) 2.22 (0.10)
15 1.32 (0.07) 1.09 (0.06) 1.09 (0.06) 1.61 (0.13) 1.77 (0.12) 2.24 (0.12)
16 1.56 (0.39) 1.25 (0.33) 0.67 (0.24) 2.30 (0.71) 2.75 (0.68) 6.85 (2.09)
17 1.05 (0.03) 0.99 (0.03) 0.99 (0.02) 1.77 (0.06) 1.88 (0.06) 2.10 (0.04)
18 0.86 (0.03) 0.93 (0.03) 0.96 (0.03) 1.75 (0.07) 1.61 (0.05) 1.68 (0.04)
19 0.90 (0.04) 0.85 (0.04) 0.89 (0.04) 1.80 (0.10) 1.83 (0.08) 1.71 (0.05)
20 1.02 (0.06) 0.94 (0.05) 1.07 (0.05) 2.03 (0.16) 2.00 (0.12) 2.16 (0.07)
21 1.23 (0.11) 0.89 (0.06) 0.79 (0.04) 1.50 (0.16) 1.97 (0.15) 2.28 (0.10)
22 1.15 (0.05) 0.97 (0.04) 0.91 (0.03) 1.44 (0.08) 1.82 (0.08) 2.09 (0.07)
23 1.31 (0.08) 1.19 (0.06) 0.95 (0.04) 1.94 (0.14) 1.68 (0.11) 1.73 (0.07)
24 0.79 (0.05) 1.03 (0.07) 1.08 (0.06) 2.01 (0.14) 1.84 (0.13) 1.58 (0.07)
25 1.09 (0.11) 0.95 (0.09) 1.07 (0.08) 2.21 (0.24) 2.31 (0.19) 2.10 (0.14)
26 1.08 (0.03) 1.04 (0.03) 1.17 (0.03) 1.77 (0.07) 1.98 (0.06) 1.90 (0.04)
27 1.22 (0.08) 1.10 (0.06) 1.36 (0.09) 1.68 (0.11) 1.98 (0.12) 2.39 (0.13)
28 1.19 (0.15) 0.99 (0.10) 1.07 (0.11) 1.74 (0.31) 1.53 (0.18) 2.89 (0.25)
29 0.85 (0.05) 0.92 (0.06) 1.12 (0.08) 2.00 (0.15) 2.01 (0.16) 2.27 (0.12)
30 1.03 (0.04) 0.94 (0.03) 0.94 (0.03) 1.95 (0.09) 1.95 (0.07) 2.16 (0.05)
31 0.96 (0.03) 1.01 (0.03) 1.08 (0.03) 2.05 (0.06) 2.14 (0.06) 2.22 (0.05)
32 1.02 (0.05) 1.03 (0.05) 1.29 (0.06) 1.78 (0.11) 1.84 (0.11) 1.85 (0.09)
33 0.85 (0.05) 1.10 (0.07) 0.97 (0.05) 2.37 (0.16) 1.85 (0.13) 2.78 (0.11)
34 0.94 (0.03) 0.84 (0.03) 0.92 (0.03) 1.83 (0.07) 1.96 (0.06) 2.10 (0.04)
35 1.04 (0.03) 0.92 (0.02) 0.88 (0.02) 1.69 (0.06) 1.68 (0.05) 2.07 (0.03)
36 1.17 (0.05) 1.02 (0.04) 0.86 (0.02) 1.88 (0.10) 1.75 (0.08) 2.11 (0.05)
37 1.09 (0.04) 0.95 (0.03) 0.85 (0.02) 1.66 (0.07) 1.61 (0.06) 1.95 (0.04)
39 1.03 (0.04) 0.91 (0.03) 0.96 (0.03) 2.11 (0.09) 2.23 (0.07) 2.12 (0.04)
40 0.96 (0.05) 0.92 (0.04) 0.97 (0.03) 1.93 (0.10) 1.75 (0.07) 1.79 (0.05)
41 0.93 (0.06) 0.83 (0.05) 0.75 (0.04) 1.87 (0.15) 1.83 (0.11) 2.37 (0.09)
42 1.21 (0.09) 1.14 (0.06) 1.11 (0.06) 1.79 (0.13) 1.59 (0.09) 1.67 (0.06)
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
24 In Brandt et al. (2012) the definition of entrants is firms which in the year they are first observed indicate a birth year at
most 2 years before. Empirical patterns are quite similar.
25 Note that the data set is able to track firms which persist even if changing governance forms and thus “institutional
category”: they continue to remain incumbents.
26 CIC 16 is not shown due to very few number of observations in the balanced panel.
Institutional change and productivity growth 583
 at Scuola Superiore Sant?A
nna on N
ovem
ber 29, 2016
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Table 8. The number of firms and percentages (in parentheses) of incumbents, genuine entrants, entrants (above the
threshold), exiters and “others”
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007
Incumbents 25,557
(18.9)
25,557
(19.1)
25,557
(18.7)
25,557
(17.3)
25,557
(16.3)
25,557
(14.6)
25,557
(10.5)
25,557
(9.4)
25,557
(8.3)
Genuine entrants NA
(NA)
686
(0.5)
729
(0.5)
2024
(1.4)
1484
(0.9)
3422
(2.0)
7331
(3.0)
8435
(3.1)
12,207
(4.0)
Entrants in panel NA
(NA)
6329 (4.7) 14,486
(10.6)
31,270
(21.2)
46,029
(29.3)
68,024
(38.9)
161,626
(66.3)
205,564
(75.7)
261,544
(85.4)
Exiters 102,934
(76.0)
96,317
(71.9)
91,582
(66.9)
84,497
(57.2)
79,807
(50.8)
73,367
(41.9)
43,923
(18.0)
26,188
(9.6)
NA
(NA)
Others 7019
(5.2)
5115
(3.8)
4476
(3.3)
4264
(2.9)
4138
(2.6)
4562
(2.6)
5469
(2.2)
5982
(2.2)
7019
(2.3)
Total 135,510
(100.0)
134,004
(100.0)
136,830
(100.0)
147,612
(100.0)
157,015
(100.0)
174,932
(100.0)
243,906
(100.0)
271,726
(100.0)
306,327
(100.0)
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
Table 9. (Balanced panel) Estimated al and ar parameters and standard errors (in parentheses) for the distribution of labor
productivities, two-digit CIC sectors
Balanced Panel
al ar
CIC 1998 2002 2007 1998 2002 2007
13 0.89 (0.08) 0.72 (0.05) 0.92 (0.12) 1.38 (0.12) 1.49 (0.09) 1.42 (0.16)
14 0.84 (0.13) 0.68 (0.07) 0.71 (0.08) 1.09 (0.17) 1.36 (0.12) 1.68 (0.15)
15 0.63 (0.07) 0.85 (0.12) 0.93 (0.09) 1.29 (0.12) 1.07 (0.14) 1.07 (0.13)
17 0.47 (0.02) 0.53 (0.03) 0.52 (0.03) 1.30 (0.05) 1.05 (0.05) 1.18 (0.05)
18 0.53 (0.03) 0.63 (0.04) 0.62 (0.05) 1.04 (0.04) 0.77 (0.05) 0.85 (0.05)
19 0.58 (0.05) 0.67 (0.10) 0.32 (0.04) 1.14 (0.07) 1.12 (0.12) 1.37 (0.08)
20 0.65 (0.08) 0.70 (0.11) 0.52 (0.07) 1.29 (0.15) 1.04 (0.15) 1.46 (0.12)
21 0.62 (0.10) 0.51 (0.08) 0.50 (0.08) 1.44 (0.19) 0.96 (0.13) 1.37 (0.11)
22 0.69 (0.06) 0.73 (0.08) 0.69 (0.05) 0.84 (0.07) 0.80 (0.08) 1.08 (0.08)
23 0.60 (0.06) 0.53 (0.04) 0.59 (0.05) 1.10 (0.09) 1.12 (0.07) 1.00 (0.08)
24 0.62 (0.06) 0.60 (0.10) 0.46 (0.06) 1.06 (0.09) 0.91 (0.13) 0.91 (0.10)
25 0.76 (0.13) 0.51 (0.17) 1.03 (0.21) 1.04 (0.18) 1.35 (0.23) 1.20 (0.23)
26 0.66 (0.03) 0.65 (0.04) 0.67 (0.03) 1.14 (0.05) 1.27 (0.06) 1.35 (0.06)
27 0.68 (0.07) 0.60 (0.06) 0.66 (0.07) 1.31 (0.12) 1.40 (0.11) 1.50 (0.13)
28 1.04 (0.21) 0.46 (0.12) 0.79 (0.61) 0.69 (0.14) 1.57 (0.17) 1.11 (0.46)
29 0.51 (0.09) 0.59 (0.18) 0.65 (0.11) 1.07 (0.14) 1.26 (0.26) 1.27 (0.17)
30 0.62 (0.04) 0.57 (0.04) 0.55 (0.05) 1.24 (0.07) 1.24 (0.08) 1.25 (0.08)
31 0.54 (0.02) 0.59 (0.04) 0.69 (0.03) 1.14 (0.04) 1.15 (0.06) 1.25 (0.06)
32 0.85 (0.08) 0.77 (0.08) 1.25 (0.23) 0.88 (0.10) 0.99 (0.11) 0.82 (0.19)
33 0.57 (0.07) 0.87 (0.12) 0.64 (0.08) 1.64 (0.11) 0.96 (0.16) 1.63 (0.15)
34 0.51 (0.03) 0.56 (0.04) 0.46 (0.03) 1.37 (0.06) 1.32 (0.07) 1.45 (0.07)
35 0.70 (0.04) 0.47 (0.02) 0.57 (0.03) 0.90 (0.05) 1.19 (0.04) 1.33 (0.05)
36 0.75 (0.05) 0.73 (0.06) 0.66 (0.04) 1.19 (0.08) 1.08 (0.08) 1.41 (0.07)
37 0.66 (0.04) 0.73 (0.05) 0.81 (0.06) 1.18 (0.06) 0.95 (0.06) 0.94 (0.07)
39 0.77 (0.06) 0.63 (0.05) 0.56 (0.04) 1.05 (0.08) 1.16 (0.07) 1.64 (0.07)
40 0.69 (0.05) 0.64 (0.06) 0.45 (0.03) 1.54 (0.08) 1.36 (0.09) 1.59 (0.07)
41 0.58 (0.06) 0.65 (0.10) 0.57 (0.05) 1.37 (0.12) 1.30 (0.15) 1.49 (0.10)
42 0.72 (0.07) 0.68 (0.08) 0.62 (0.09) 1.17 (0.12) 0.93 (0.09) 1.03 (0.11)
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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and br parameters) are similarly fat-tailed. The only major significant difference concern the al parameters which in
the unbalanced panel start large at the beginning of the period and shrink thereafter, while in the balanced one they
tend to be relatively small from the beginning. That is, the shrinking of the width of the left part of the distribution—
the less efficient one—is fundamentally due to some disappearance of the relatively less productive among the initial
incumbents (and to some extent “churning,” the entry and exit of new short-lived firms).
Figure 7 displays the average labor productivity by groups over the years. Note that the productivity of the incum-
bents is always the highest. Interestingly, after 2002, productivity is higher among exiters than entrants (this applies
also at two-digit level) hinting at the marginality of a good deal of de novo entrants. Figure 8 shows the labor prod-
uctivity distribution by type in two selected sectors (all two-digit sectors display qualitatively the same pattern). Not
surprisingly the left tails of the distribution for exiters have large supports (many exiters are relatively low-efficiency
firms). What is more puzzling is that the right tail is very close to that of incumbents. One of the reasons might be
that “exit” may mean acquisition and not death. However, it may well be the case that firms actually die for reasons
other than lack of technological efficiency, but e.g. due to financial fragility in presence of a myopic financial system
(on the Italian evidence, see Bottazzi et al., 2006). We leave these important questions to further research.
Table 10. (Balanced panel) Estimated bl and br parameters and standard errors (in parentheses) for the distribution of labor
productivities, two-digit CIC sectors
Balanced panel
bl br
CIC 1998 2002 2007 1998 2002 2007
13 1.18 (0.14) 0.97 (0.10) 1.42 (0.21) 2.30 (0.26) 2.69 (0.26) 2.34 (0.30)
14 1.42 (0.26) 1.05 (0.16) 1.06 (0.18) 2.07 (0.37) 2.10 (0.28) 2.66 (0.37)
15 1.01 (0.17) 1.33 (0.24) 1.08 (0.16) 1.95 (0.28) 1.53 (0.26) 1.57 (0.25)
17 0.85 (0.07) 0.95 (0.07) 0.97 (0.08) 2.21 (0.14) 2.11 (0.15) 2.08 (0.14)
18 0.76 (0.05) 1.22 (0.12) 1.26 (0.13) 1.86 (0.14) 1.33 (0.12) 1.24 (0.11)
19 0.75 (0.08) 1.38 (0.26) 0.93 (0.16) 1.72 (0.18) 1.62 (0.22) 1.97 (0.21)
20 0.92 (0.18) 1.14 (0.24) 0.73 (0.13) 2.61 (0.51) 1.60 (0.31) 1.99 (0.31)
21 0.93 (0.23) 0.99 (0.23) 0.63 (0.11) 3.21 (0.77) 1.66 (0.34) 2.50 (0.45)
22 1.25 (0.16) 1.40 (0.19) 0.94 (0.10) 1.32 (0.15) 1.37 (0.17) 1.72 (0.18)
23 1.01 (0.14) 0.80 (0.09) 1.02 (0.14) 1.72 (0.21) 2.05 (0.23) 1.63 (0.20)
24 0.84 (0.11) 1.31 (0.27) 1.10 (0.21) 1.89 (0.27) 1.78 (0.31) 1.74 (0.26)
25 1.07 (0.26) 1.34 (0.54) 1.27 (0.34) 1.53 (0.36) 1.82 (0.43) 1.34 (0.34)
26 0.98 (0.07) 1.08 (0.09) 0.98 (0.07) 1.70 (0.11) 2.08 (0.15) 2.03 (0.13)
27 1.15 (0.16) 1.10 (0.16) 1.12 (0.17) 2.24 (0.27) 2.91 (0.35) 3.02 (0.39)
28 1.62 (0.47) 0.57 (0.14) 3.21 (2.51) 1.01 (0.30) 2.44 (0.60) 1.62 (0.71)
29 1.17 (0.26) 1.53 (0.53) 1.22 (0.27) 2.27 (0.41) 2.91 (0.71) 2.01 (0.35)
30 0.93 (0.09) 1.05 (0.12) 1.08 (0.13) 2.11 (0.19) 2.30 (0.22) 1.91 (0.17)
31 0.87 (0.05) 1.16 (0.10) 1.01 (0.07) 1.96 (0.12) 1.87 (0.13) 2.06 (0.14)
32 1.07 (0.15) 1.03 (0.15) 2.19 (0.47) 1.36 (0.21) 1.58 (0.25) 1.57 (0.41)
33 0.67 (0.10) 1.18 (0.22) 0.98 (0.18) 3.34 (0.53) 1.76 (0.37) 2.38 (0.36)
34 0.84 (0.08) 1.05 (0.11) 0.94 (0.11) 2.02 (0.15) 2.03 (0.17) 2.14 (0.17)
35 1.10 (0.08) 0.89 (0.06) 0.91 (0.06) 1.48 (0.10) 2.03 (0.12) 2.27 (0.14)
36 0.99 (0.09) 1.20 (0.13) 0.77 (0.06) 2.09 (0.20) 1.67 (0.17) 1.98 (0.16)
37 0.92 (0.07) 1.14 (0.10) 1.38 (0.14) 1.68 (0.13) 1.44 (0.12) 1.41 (0.13)
39 1.37 (0.14) 1.26 (0.13) 1.02 (0.10) 1.80 (0.17) 1.97 (0.16) 2.50 (0.18)
40 0.87 (0.09) 1.09 (0.13) 0.73 (0.07) 2.07 (0.19) 1.84 (0.18) 2.14 (0.17)
41 0.89 (0.14) 1.22 (0.25) 0.74 (0.10) 2.15 (0.30) 1.84 (0.29) 1.77 (0.20)
42 1.03 (0.15) 1.28 (0.21) 1.22 (0.22) 1.85 (0.26) 1.19 (0.15) 1.50 (0.22)
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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6.2 Growth rates of labor productivity
Let us look next at the properties of growth rates. Figure 9 displays the empirical distribution and EP fit of growth
rates of labor productivity of selected sectors for periods 1998–2002 and 2003–2007.
They are all fat-tailed and symmetric. Such long-term “lumpiness” of productivity growth events clearly militates
against any notion of productivity growth resulting from of a smooth process made by small independent improve-
ments. Rather, it appears characterized by relatively frequent “big” idiosyncratic shocks (Dosi et al., 2012; Dosi,
2007), plausibly of technological but also strategic and institutional nature.
Table 11 shows the autocorrelation coefficients for relative labor productivity in levels and first differences: the rela-
tive productivity levels are quite persistent over time, with only some relatively mild regression-to-the-mean tendency.27
7. The comparative evidence across ownership and governance forms
If we treat firms switching ownership categories as continuing firms (as shown in Table 12) apply formula 3 (cf.
above, Section 5), we can decompose the total growth of manufacturing sector into the contribution of each owner-
ship and further decompose the latter into the contribution of each effect. Using this method, the contributions of ef-
fects can be compared across different ownership types.28
Almost 50% of within effect can be attributed to SOEs only during 1998–2002 and both SOEs and SHEs between
2002 and 2007. The contribution of within effect of the ownership-switching group has been increased from 8.6% to
15.5%. The contribution of genuine entry effects doubled to 26% in the second subperiod. FIEs, SHEs and China’s
POEs are the most contributed groups.
Furthermore, at finer level of disaggregation, we replicate the same exercise for each two-digit sector (see
Figures 10 and 11) and find similar evidence.
7.1 Aggregate evidence
Distributions and their dynamics are deeply affected by the organizational types of the micro entities. Let us consider
them.
Figure 7. Average value added per employee of incumbents, entrants, and exiters (at 1998 constant price; 1000 yuan¼ 1). Source:
our elaboration on CMM.
27 For the estimates we adopt the approach described in Chesher (1979).
28 For a highly complementary analysis on the micro patterns of firm growth by ownership types, see Duschl and Peng
(2015), this issue.
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Let us start by noticing that over the period under consideration the Chinese industry underwent deep changes in
its ownership and governance patterns. Figure 12 illustrates the fall of fully publicly owned firms. The share of SOEs
and COEs drops from 66% in 1998 to around 7% in 2007 in terms of number of firms, and from 60% to 14% in
terms of value added. On the contrary, one observes a surge of “shareholding” firms, as such a “capitalist” trans-
formation of SOEs, and of private enterprises. SHEs increased from 7% in 1998 to 17.3% in 2007 in terms of num-
bers, and from 11% to 26.8% in terms of value added. Together, the share of domestic private enterprises has
increased dramatically from 7.4% in 1998 to 54% in 2007 in terms of numbers and less dramatically from 3.2% to
26% as measured by value added.
The relative importance of public and private (domestic and foreign) forms of ownership however differs a lot
across sectors. The “core” industries continue to be dominated by SOEs and/or by State-participated SHEs, even after
the privatization process. For instance, in 2007, the value-added share of SOEs and SHEs was 67% for petroleum
sector, 64% in nonferrous metals, 54% in ferrous metals. In transport equipment, the value added share of SOEs and
shareholdings was 35%, while that of FIEs was 42%.29 The activities dominated by privately owned companies are
quite diverse, but mainly concentrated in “competitive sectors” as defined by the government policies, such as food
Table 11. AR(1) coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for normalized (log) labor productivity in levels
and first differences
CIC Sector Levels First differences
13 Food processing of agricultural products 0.844 (0.010) 0.308 (0.024)
14 Other foodstuff 0.892 (0.014) 0.267 (0.034)
15 Beverages 0.893 (0.015) 0.302 (0.039)
16 Tobacco 0.982 (0.016) 0.236 (0.077)
17 Textile 0.844 (0.009) 0.286 (0.019)
18 Garments, footwear etc. 0.812 (0.011) 0.255 (0.018)
19 Leather, fur, feather etc. 0.846 (0.017) 0.304 (0.025)
20 Processing of timber, manuf. Of wood, bamboo etc. 0.844 (0.022) 0.208 (0.040)
21 Furniture 0.829 (0.024) 0.280 (0.043)
22 Paper and paper products 0.840 (0.013) 0.247 (0.024)
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 0.876 (0.012) 0.333 (0.058)
24 Articles for culture, education and sports 0.828 (0.018) 0.318 (0.030)
25 Processing of petroleum, cokeries, nuclear fuel 0.904 (0.025) 0.241 (0.056)
26 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 0.895 (0.007) 0.282 (0.014)
27 Pharmaceuticals 0.858 (0.011) 0.280 (0.022)
28 Chemical fibers 0.825 (0.052) 0.123 (0.051)
29 Rubber 0.891 (0.020) 0.226 (0.039)
30 Plastics 0.845 (0.012) 0.283 (0.022)
31 Non-metallic mineral products 0.888 (0.006) 0.289 (0.015)
32 Smelting and processing of ferrous metals 0.823 (0.031) 0.273 (0.045)
33 Smelting and processing of non-ferrous metals 0.865 (0.020) 0.297 (0.037)
34 Metal products 0.883 (0.010) 0.309 (0.025)
35 General purpose machinery 0.890 (0.007) 0.246 (0.016)
36 Special purpose machinery 0.893 (0.012) 0.236 (0.028)
37 Transport equipment 0.889 (0.010) 0.245 (0.021)
39 Electrical machinery and equipment 0.874 (0.009) 0.295 (0.020)
40 Communication equipments, computer etc. 0.890 (0.010) 0.247 (0.024)
41 Measuring instruments and machinery 0.901 (0.017) 0.359 (0.049)
42 Artwork and other 0.866 (0.018) 0.258 (0.030)
Aggregate 0.872 (0.002) 0.279 (0.005)
Source: Elaboration on BCMM.
29 In transport equipment sector, FIEs are mainly joint ventures between foreign MNCs and the State and, in most cases,
the Chinese side is the controlling shareholder.
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product, textile, nonmetallic minerals products, metal products. High and medium-high tech sectors (as classified by
OECD taxonomy, with the caveat that in China, most of these sectors also contain a quite large labor-intensive ex-
port-processing part), such as communication equipment, computers, measuring instrument, etc. display a persist-
ently high share of FIEs over the whole period, but also a significant presence of shareholding enterprises (often in
the technological upper end of the industries).
Over the period, a good deal of the changes in the shares of different types of firms is due to a fast transformation
in the forms of corporate governance of incumbents. Table 13 present, by governance type, the percentage of firms
which maintain their institutional characteristics (“keep”), enter (“entry”), exit, move-in the type (“S-in”), and move
to other types (“S-out”). The percentage share of “out” firms is the highest in publicly (both State and collective)
owned enterprises in both periods. “Shareholding” and “domestic private” categories have highest share of entrants
and they are also the main destinations of firms undertaking restructuring. (To repeat, “enter,” “exit,” etc. stand for
institutional categories and not entry or exit into the industry.)
Figure 13 displays the trend in labor productivity by corporate type. FIEs (MNCs and JVs), not too surprisingly,
keep the highest productivity levels, but, interestingly, display also the weaker growth rates. Conversely, Chinese
firms, of all types—private, State-owned, and mixed ownership—all grow faster in an impressive catching-up proc-
esses. In 1998, SOEs had on average a quarter of the labor productivity of FIE and “shareholding” ones had a half.
In 2007, SOE displayed around 70% and shareholding around 80% of the FIE average productivity.
Moreover, among Chinese firms, those which restructure (especially among the SOE) display the highest dy-
namics: see Table 14 covering the 10 largest sectors.
7.2 Micro-evidence
The foregoing evidence regards, the means of productivities by governance/ownership types. Let us now zoom-in
onto the whole distributions.
Table 12. Decomposition of aggregate labor productivity by ownership types (% contribution to overall productivity
growth)
Ownership Total growth Ownership keep Ownership change Exit Entry Total
Within Between Inter Within Between Inter Real Growth
% % % % % % % % % %
1998–2002
SOE 0.95 18.09 2.15 3.33 3.16 0.78 0.78 6.21 0.46 4.29 31.03
Collective 5.22 1.83 1.95 2.66 0.99 0.65 0.92 0.59 2.84 12.45
HMT-invested 3.38 1.83 0.76 0.84 0.37 0.23 0.45 1.59 2.76 9.33
Foreign-invested 6.64 2.94 0.31 0.82 0.18 0.16 1.07 2.86 6.44 18.96
Shareholding 3.67 1.16 0.50 0.76 0.19 0.08 0.37 5.41 9.53 20.52
Private 1.04 0.25 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.02 2.48 3.24 7.15
Other domestic 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.55
Total 38.17 10.21 6.41 8.59 2.68 1.95 6.01 13.48 29.20 100.00
2002–2007
SOE 1.01 13.05 0.01 6.73 4.22 0.56 1.84 2.97 2.23 2.61 17.04
Collective 2.21 0.71 1.01 4.16 0.73 1.73 2.07 0.50 0.99 8.63
HMT-invested 2.99 1.10 2.02 0.70 0.22 0.54 0.53 1.69 1.09 5.77
Foreign-invested 6.02 1.99 3.77 0.59 0.17 0.23 0.52 7.49 6.42 18.16
Shareholding 10.87 2.27 4.88 3.56 0.47 1.23 1.17 5.64 8.03 25.90
Private 6.13 1.13 2.19 2.01 0.31 0.95 1.69 8.39 7.54 24.05
Other domestic 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.46
Total 41.36 7.18 20.66 15.46 2.53 6.72 7.97 26.04 26.85 100.00
Note: Treat firms switching their ownership categories as continuing firms.
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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Figure 14 displays the kernel density plots in selected sectors and their evolutionary patterns by corporate types.30
In addition to the different levels of labor productivity, notice that the empirical distribution of SOE is significantly
different from that of the others, in terms of wider support, fatter left-tail, underling a catching-up process however
characterized by an increasing dual structure, with a small group of SOEs lagging behind. Overall, the empirical den-
sities of six ownership types converge over time.
In order to disentangle statistically the importance of the six types, we construct two panels (an unbalanced and a
balanced one) containing the ML estimators of five parameters of AEP fits of annual labor productivity distribution
by sectors and by ownership.31 A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated yearly measures is employed
to test the effects of ownership, time, and their interaction in a model such as
Yijk ¼ l . . . þ qið jÞ þ aj þ bk þ ðabÞjk þ ijk (5)
with Yijk the estimated AEP parameters al, ar, bl, br, and m respectively; aj ownership effect, j 2 {1, . . . , 6}32; bk year
effect, k 2 {1998, . . . , 2007}; (ab)jk interaction effect of ownership and year; qi(j) sector effects, i 2 {1, . . . , 25}; ijk
residual.
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Figure 10. (1998–2002) Percentage contributions of within, between, interaction effects of both firms invariant in ownership type
(denoted by “Within K,” “Bet K,” and “Inter K” respectively) and ownership-switching firms (denoted by “Within S,” “Bet S,” and
“Inter S” respectively), and net entry effects (the sum of exit and greenfield entry effects) by two-digit sectors and by ownership
types. Note: The sectors are in ascending order in terms of their overall productivity growth rates.
30 We only display four ownership types on each figure, neglecting COE and HMT.
31 This panel includes 1350 observations obtained by 6 ownerships 25 CICs 9 years. CIC 16, 25, 28 and 42 are
excluded, due to the low number of observations. Likewise, the category “other domestic enterprises” is disregarded.
32 1–6 indicate SOEs, COEs, HMTs, FIEs, SHEs, and POEs.
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Figure 12. Annual percentage shares of ownership categories to total value added. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
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Figure 11. (2002–2007) Percentage contributions of within, between, interaction effects of both firms invariant in ownership type
(denoted by “Within K,” “Bet K,” and “Inter K” respectively) and ownership-switching firms (denoted by “Within S,” “Bet S.” and
“Inter S” respectively), and net entry effects (the sum of exit and greenfield entry effects) by two-digit sectors and by ownership
types. Note: The sectors are in ascending order in terms of their overall productivity growth rates.
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Figure 13. Average value added per employee by corporate categories (at 1998 constant price; 1000 yuan¼ 1). Source: our elabor-
ation on CMM.
Table 13. Dynamics of ownership distribution for 1998–2002 and 2002–2007: shares of ownership-keeping firms (“Keep”),
exits (“Exit”), ownership-switching-out in percentage of firms in the initial year (“S-out”) and shares of ownership-keeping
firms (“Keep”), entrants (“Entry”) and ownership-switching-in firms (“S-in”) in the ending year
Percentage of firms in initial year Percentage of firms in final year
Ownership Keep Exit S-out Total Keep Entry S-in Total
1998–2002
SOE 31.94 60.23 7.83 100 (38,121) 63.77 34.38 1.86 100 (19,095)
COE 29.05 58.17 12.79 100 (52,099) 45.04 51.07 3.89 100 (33,599)
HMT 51.34 42.37 6.29 100 (14,410) 40.37 53.19 6.43 100 (18,324)
FOE 54.66 35.23 10.11 100 (9700) 38.20 56.12 5.67 100 (13,878)
SHE 38.10 48.91 12.99 100 (9447) 14.75 64.76 20.49 100 (24,393)
POE 34.66 58.86 6.48 100 (10,078) 7.52 81.99 10.49 100 (46,441)
ODE 23.50 52.87 23.63 100 (1655) 30.27 45.60 24.12 100 (1285)
Total 35.05 54.77 10.19 100 (135,510) 30.25 60.96 8.79 100 (157,015)
2002–2007
SOE 18.27 72.14 9.59 100 (19,095) 59.66 33.61 6.73 100 (6316)
COE 18.26 58.51 23.23 100 (33,599) 45.40 48.01 6.60 100 (15,739)
HMT 50.16 38.54 11.30 100 (18,324) 36.99 57.01 6.01 100 (30,951)
FOE 59.70 32.14 8.16 100 (13,878) 31.58 60.40 8.03 100 (33,890)
SHE 37.09 44.17 18.74 100 (24,393) 22.56 62.75 14.69 100 (52,969)
POE 42.27 50.24 7.49 100 (46,441) 19.31 74.41 6.29 100 (165,027)
ODE 11.21 58.05 30.74 100 (1285) 11.43 65.37 23.21 100 (1435)
Total 35.62 50.82 13.56 100 (157,015) 25.15 66.84 8.01 100 (306,327)
Number of firms in brackets.
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
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Let us first consider the unbalanced panel. Remarkably, ownership effect turns out indeed to be highly significant
for all five parameters.
The differences across distributions conditional on ownership and their evolving patterns are detected adopting
post hoc Tukey simultaneous pairwise comparison techniques.33 The average values of AEP parameters over sectors
and years for each ownership category are shown in Table 15.34
In particular, first, corporate types exert a statistically significant influence on the value of al (the width of the less
efficient part of the distribution), with SOEs having the largest and domestic private the smallest ones. Conversely,
FIEs display the largest contribution to the upper-tail (ar) and both domestic private firms and SOEs the smallest one.
Concerning the b-values (recall that they relate to the properties of the tail), they appear quite similar across own-
ership types with respect to the (quite fat) lower tail, while Chinese firms of all types but especially SOEs in the upper
echelons of productivity are more heterogeneous (display a fatter tail) than foreign ventures.
Third, also time effects are significant for al and ar. The post hoc Tuckey pairwise comparison of mean values of
parameters over years shows that in the final years 2005–2007 the al are significantly smaller than those of
1998–2003. Conversely, ar of years 2006–2007 are significantly greater than those of 1998–2002. (Indeed, we detect
a regime change reflected by productivity distributions, around year 2003).
Fourth, the Ownership and Year interaction effect is significant, meaning that the evolving patterns of labor prod-
uctivity distributions differ across different ownership types.
Table 14. Average growth rates of labor productivity, largest 10 sectors, firms keeping their ownership and switching-
types
SOE COE HMT FIE SHE POE
CIC Keep Switch Keep Switch Keep Switch Keep Switch Keep Switch Keep Switch
1998–2002
13 4.95 14.54 8.65 11.14 10.14 10.13 9.08 5.66 8.09 10.48 8.18 9.55
17 8.75 12.69 10.02 11.93 6.42 16.33 4.64 9.38 8.56 14.28 12.75 13.24
26 8.55 15.17 8.68 10.86 6.60 7.15 12.73 6.51 13.71 8.41 11.85 8.70
31 8.25 13.42 8.82 10.26 8.38 10.31 9.66 7.03 8.67 11.52 12.45 11.79
32 15.91 22.76 8.70 14.53 7.67 0.56 6.97 27.71 9.19 8.72 13.35 14.70
33 16.39 20.07 10.30 11.68 16.53 27.44 3.66 25.04 14.23 15.83 12.47 13.07
35 12.27 19.93 12.56 12.55 10.16 7.75 15.73 14.15 12.81 15.65 10.37 9.00
37 11.87 20.50 8.72 9.48 3.46 10.58 13.54 7.76 15.65 13.42 12.17 10.28
39 9.33 9.84 7.19 7.56 6.79 9.50 9.37 7.68 7.67 10.07 16.54 13.39
40 11.54 12.35 7.93 7.11 6.24 5.05 7.87 6.23 8.77 18.20 7.47 6.04
2002–2007
13 12.56 16.23 12.41 12.91 4.91 9.24 7.88 11.99 10.38 13.20 16.10 16.77
17 8.48 13.23 9.53 11.16 4.89 7.55 6.84 8.26 9.48 12.89 12.05 11.30
26 14.03 16.66 8.91 11.42 6.12 5.89 7.57 11.55 11.94 12.85 13.26 11.25
31 12.44 13.77 13.97 15.65 5.84 8.64 7.59 10.42 11.80 15.42 16.54 16.70
32 13.70 21.02 12.34 10.56 1.66 14.42 3.13 18.88 17.00 18.84 13.11 12.77
33 11.89 15.07 11.61 11.58 12.05 14.54 10.18 16.98 10.82 7.06 12.35 15.36
35 14.47 22.62 13.17 16.04 8.54 10.51 10.35 13.08 16.20 15.77 15.34 14.37
37 16.26 18.35 11.67 14.57 6.52 10.71 7.03 2.86 11.84 12.44 14.19 11.53
39 6.78 16.23 8.41 11.47 3.55 5.77 6.16 4.81 8.84 12.32 10.20 13.97
40 0.40 8.27 0.46 11.13 1.48 4.57 2.05 1.76 1.31 7.98 6.53 6.76
Source: Our elaboration on CMM.
33 The Tukey’s hsd test statistic is q
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MSE=n
p
, where MSE is the mean square error computed following the analysis of
variance, n is the sample size per group and q is the studentized range critical value.
34 The post hoc Tukey pairwise comparison of mean differences of six ownership-groups is available upon request.
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Figure 14. Empirical density of normalized (log) labor productivity of four ownership categories (SOEs, FIEs, SHEs, and private en-
terprises) for chemical (CIC 26), transport equipment (CIC 37) and communication equipment, computers, etc. (CIC 40), for years
1998, 2003, and 2007. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
Table 15. (Unbalanced Panel) Average value of parameters of AEP fits for each ownership category
Order al Ownership ar Ownership bl Ownership br Ownership
Smallest 0.622 Private 1.057 SOE 1.039 Shareholding 1.835 SOE
0.713 Collective 1.112 Private 1.047 Collective 1.984 Private
0.744 HMT-invested 1.152 Shareholding 1.104 Private 1.999 Shareholding
0.746 Shareholding 1.169 Collective 1.120 HMT-invested 1.999 Collective
0.805 Foreign-invested 1.202 HMT-invested 1.124 SOE 2.061 HMT-invested
Largest 1.212 SOE 1.336 Foreign-invested 1.162 Foreign-invested 2.238 Foreign-invested
Source: post hoc Tukey Pairwise comparison of ownership effects.
Table 16. (Balanced Panel) Median value of parameters of AEP fits for each ownership category
Order al Ownership ar Ownership
Smallest 0.585 (0.748) Private 0.779 (0.881) SOE
0.611 (0.675) Shareholding 0.922 (0.974) Private
0.650 (0.733) Collective 1.000 (1.067) Collective
0.661 (0.792) HMT-invested 1.021 (1.143) Foreign-invested
0.812 (0.887) SOE 1.058 (1.060) Shareholding
Largest 0.823 (0.958) Foreign-invested 1.148 (1.192) HMT-invested
Note: mean values are reported in parentheses.
Source: post hoc Tukey Pairwise comparison of ownership effects.
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Finally, we use a similar method (one-way ANOVA with repeated measures in year and post hoc Tukey pairwise
comparison) to test the year effect on parameters for each ownership type separately. In particular, the estimates,
available on request from the author, show a significant time effect on the (shrinking process of the) left tail of State-
owned, Shareholding and private Chinese firms highlighting yet another piece of evidence on the dynamism of do-
mestic firms of all types. Together we find a significant time effect on the (expanding) contribution to the support of
the right tail by Chinese domestic POEs.
Again, it is interesting to compare this evidence with the balanced panel.35 First, ownership effects continue to be
significant for the al and ar values. Interestingly, however, according to post hoc Tukey pairwise comparisons, the al
parameters of SOEs and FIEs are significantly larger than SHEs, COEs, and domestic POEs (see Table 16). That is,
both incumbent SOE and incumbent foreign investors appear to be more “dualistic” than other types of domestic
Chinese firms. Second, the time effect is significant only on ar (but not on al) for the parameter estimates based on
balanced panel: that is, incumbent firms do not seem to display any time-dependent movement concerning the firms
in the lower relative productivity brackets (Note however that the phenomenon is subject to a major selection bias: a
lot of low productivity firms have actually died over the period). Third, the interaction effect is still significant, even
if the levels of significance are lower than in the unbalanced panel.
In a nutshell, the statistical analysis corroborates the foregoing interpretation of patterns of Chinese industrial
learning and catching-up. At the beginning of our window of observation domestic firms display relatively higher de-
grees of heterogeneity, with a high density on the “inefficient” side and a low one on the “efficient” one (especially
regarding fully private firms).
The dynamic however displays different patterns according to ownership/governance types, highlighting a gener-
alized catching-up of all types of Chinese firms (but based on different mechanisms), and, at the same time, no time
effect on both tails of FIEs on either sets of estimates (balanced and unbalanced panels). First, year effects are statis-
tically significant on the expanding process of the right-tail of China’s domestic POEs on both sets of estimates.
Second, the shrinking process of the left-tail (of SOEs, SHEs and China’s domestic POEs) is only significant based on
unbalanced panel: basically, that means also that a lot of weeding out of lower efficiency firms took place together
with learning.
8. Conclusion
In this work, we investigated the microeconomic patterns underling the impressive growth of labor productivity in
Chinese manufacturing over the most recent decade for which data are available.
The evidence suggests that the major driver of such dynamic rests in a fast catching-up by Chinese firms of differ-
ent governance and ownership structures. The dispersion in productivities, still extremely high in the late 90s, signifi-
cantly shrinks due to exit, but also more importantly, organizational change involving deep transformations in
governance and together technological learning.
In all that, firms which initially were State-owned play a very important role. Most of them modify their structure
gaining the shape of management-run “capitalist” firms. And many of them (the “shareholding” ones) become State-
private JVs. Together, newly born private domestic firms gain importance even if mostly in industries characterized
by relatively low technological sophistication. Interestingly, aggregate manufacturing productivity growth does not
appear to be influenced by “structural change” at the coarse-grained level of two-digit industries: China seems to
have achieved quite early a “mature” composition of industrial sectors.
Finally, our evidence suggests that FMNCs and JVs do often display initial above-average productivities, but they
are also the group of firms with a relatively lower rate of productivity growth.
Indeed, the overall picture suggests a fast process of restructuring and learning rooted in the deep transformation
of domestic (often ex-State owned) enterprises. Fundamentally, the story underlying the impressive catching up of
Chinese manufacturing is much more one of creative restructuring and accumulation of absorptive capabilities by do-
mestic firms, rather than sheer “creative destruction” and even less so by an MNC-led drive. In fact, the Chinese pat-
terns of industrialization and catching-up are well in tune with a view of the development process driven by
35 Given the smaller number of firms in the balanced panel, tails (i.e. the b’s estimates) are quite unstable even if always
fat-tailed. Hence, we discuss here only the a’s values.
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processes of capability accumulation (Cimoli et al., 2009), diverse across firms but generalized across the whole in-
dustry, wherein domestic firms play a paramount role.
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Appendix
Comparative capital intensities and decompositions of labor productivity growth
Table A1. The median of capital intensity (capital/output ratios) by sector
NACE Sector China Italy France China Italy France China Italy Francea
1998 2002 2006
173 Finishing of textiles 2.772 1.971 1.863 0.732 0.755 0.694 1.228 1.512 1.546
175 Carpets, rugs and other textiles 1.672 1.327 0.789 0.752 0.775 0.688 0.891 0.987 1.055
182 Wearing apparel 1.052 0.785 0.620 0.268 0.276 0.226 0.318 0.318 0.336
193 Footwear 1.062 0.885 0.529 0.29 0.331 0.288 0.488 0.631 0.645
203 Wood products for construction 1.477 0.954 0.629 0.728 0.734 0.763 0.773 0.744 0.736
212 Articles of paper and paperboard 1.475 1.367 1.123 0.824 0.901 0.988 1.025 1.206 1.217
221 Publishing 3.873 5.250 5.716 0.259 0.19 0.117 0.229 0.204 0.192
222 Printing 2.559 2.456 2.084 0.508 0.566 0.562 0.7 0.797 0.792
241 Production of basic chemicals 2.547 1.784 1.049 0.977 1.045 1.153 2.081 2.443 2.811
243 Paints, varnishes, inks mastics 1.312 1.086 0.852 0.584 0.544 0.57 0.946 0.936 1.052
244 Pharma., med. chemicals, botanical prod 1.707 1.514 1.508 0.57 0.623 0.656 0.666 0.83 0.837
246 Other chemical products 1.436 1.167 0.707 0.588 0.628 0.636 0.973 1.004 1.072
251 Rubber products 1.587 1.479 0.974 0.514 0.588 0.495 0.951 1.088 1.03
252 Plastic products 1.614 1.394 1.055 0.714 0.795 0.818 0.969 0.991 1.035
261 Glass and glass products 1.696 1.442 1.079 0.579 0.594 0.742 0.996 1.169 1.198
266 Concrete, plaster and cement 2.084 1.643 1.676 0.93 0.847 0.965 1.365 1.399 1.253
275 Casting of metals 1.113 0.937 0.698 0.669 0.815 0.734 0.886 1.127 1.128
281 Structural metal products 1.290 1.176 0.870 0.433 0.481 0.455 0.547 0.505 0.569
284 Forging, pressing, stamping, of metal 1.981 1.289 0.820 0.574 0.695 0.618 0.77 0.913 0.967
285 Treatment and coating of metals 1.113 0.980 0.923 0.452 0.515 0.467 0.673 0.762 0.803
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 1.554 1.068 0.940 0.471 0.584 0.559 0.734 0.861 0.892
287 Other fabricated metal products 1.337 1.018 0.788 0.586 0.626 0.566 0.818 0.921 0.871
291 Machinery for prod. use of mech. power 2.041 1.524 1.012 0.48 0.491 0.408 0.674 0.76 0.714
292 Other general purpose machinery 1.756 1.321 0.905 0.323 0.315 0.272 0.372 0.364 0.361
294 Machine Tools 2.530 1.669 0.961 0.343 0.391 0.289 0.425 0.465 0.466
295 Other special purpose machinery 2.177 1.486 0.977 0.358 0.337 0.332 0.52 0.585 0.614
311 Electric motors, generators and transform 1.570 1.200 0.767 0.369 0.452 0.397 0.51 0.526 0.501
312 Manuf. of electricity distrib, control equip 1.409 1.127 0.781 0.335 0.453 0.352 0.64 0.648 0.553
316 Electrical equipment not e/where class 1.163 0.863 0.671 0.299 0.288 0.275 0.498 0.516 0.497
343 Parts for motor vehicles and their engines 1.781 1.336 1.094 0.526 0.63 0.534 1.088 1.311 1.185
361 Furniture 1.293 1.092 0.798 0.593 0.61 0.564 0.633 0.674 0.722
366 Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.793 0.830 0.808 0.467 0.485 0.405 0.576 0.669 0.781
Mean 1.713 1.419 1.127 0.534 0.574 0.550 0.780 0.871 0.888
Median 1.578 1.305 0.914 0.520 0.586 0.561 0.717 0.814 0.820
Note: aIn the last column, the France data is year 2004.
Source: CMM, INSEE (on France), and ISTAT-Micro 3 (on Italy).
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Table A2. China: OLS regression results of ln(V A/L)¼ aþ bln(K/V A)þ , with robustic standard errors
NACE Sector Coef SE R2 Coef SE R2 Coef SE R2
1998 2002 2006
151 Production, process and preserv. Of meat 0.608 0.019 0.587 0.519 0.020 0.475 0.541 0.047 0.420
155 Dairy products 0.620 0.049 0.553 0.533 0.043 0.382 0.656 0.080 0.451
158 Prod. Of other food 0.674 0.015 0.538 0.561 0.016 0.438 0.402 0.033 0.259
159 Beverages 0.590 0.019 0.440 0.487 0.021 0.332 0.464 0.043 0.240
173 Finishing of textiles 0.551 0.042 0.451 0.467 0.026 0.397 0.458 0.088 0.323
175 Carpets, rugs and other textiles 0.457 0.024 0.309 0.316 0.022 0.168 0.315 0.054 0.213
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 0.460 0.022 0.335 0.289 0.018 0.163 0.292 0.060 0.143
182 Wearing apparel 0.465 0.013 0.339 0.377 0.011 0.258 0.332 0.039 0.183
192 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 0.369 0.046 0.240 0.292 0.034 0.161 0.265 0.116 0.132
193 Footwear 0.510 0.032 0.407 0.354 0.022 0.269 0.323 0.036 0.327
203 Wood products for construction 0.549 0.023 0.504 0.409 0.026 0.320 0.333 0.091 0.147
205 Other wood prod. 0.404 0.069 0.283 0.254 0.052 0.138 0.233 0.139 0.151
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.548 0.024 0.425 0.404 0.023 0.275 0.298 0.095 0.144
212 Articles of paper and paperboard 0.508 0.026 0.338 0.386 0.022 0.237 0.379 0.092 0.219
221 Publishing 0.594 0.259 0.315 0.352 0.209 0.138 0.298 0.665 0.235
222 Printing 0.631 0.021 0.405 0.569 0.023 0.359 0.324 0.072 0.151
241 Production of basic chemicals 0.629 0.016 0.525 0.468 0.017 0.345 0.380 0.034 0.239
243 Paints, varnishes, inks mastics 0.514 0.025 0.372 0.492 0.022 0.327 0.506 0.039 0.290
244 Pharma., med. chemicals, botanical prod 0.585 0.019 0.415 0.554 0.018 0.381 0.582 0.025 0.427
245 Soap and detergents perfumes and toilet prep 0.563 0.033 0.392 0.518 0.028 0.382 0.400 0.059 0.211
246 Other chemical products 0.578 0.026 0.432 0.455 0.022 0.290 0.400 0.040 0.184
251 Rubber products 0.461 0.036 0.316 0.473 0.028 0.322 0.339 0.061 0.178
252 Plastic products 0.470 0.014 0.309 0.375 0.013 0.223 0.352 0.035 0.173
261 Glass and glass products 0.441 0.028 0.295 0.304 0.026 0.165 0.313 0.054 0.133
262 Ceramic, refractory not, not for construction 0.569 0.032 0.412 0.433 0.027 0.242 0.280 0.056 0.103
263 Ceramic goods for construction 0.383 0.022 0.239 0.339 0.023 0.182 0.306 0.060 0.147
266 Concrete, plaster and cement 0.506 0.023 0.355 0.433 0.027 0.259 0.331 0.076 0.148
267 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 0.469 0.032 0.396 0.390 0.031 0.272 0.456 0.092 0.318
275 Casting of metals 0.553 0.020 0.473 0.442 0.020 0.340 0.496 0.078 0.295
281 Structural metal products 0.506 0.032 0.370 0.491 0.025 0.335 0.424 0.052 0.231
283 Steam generators, except central heating 0.650 0.048 0.556 0.563 0.042 0.458 0.612 0.089 0.458
284 Forging, pressing, stamping, of metal 0.633 0.048 0.526 0.438 0.057 0.348 0.501 0.079 0.374
285 Treatment and coating of metals 0.470 0.047 0.316 0.406 0.039 0.220 0.150 0.209 0.016
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 0.583 0.033 0.468 0.462 0.034 0.342 0.400 0.080 0.238
287 Other fabricated metal products 0.438 0.019 0.285 0.391 0.017 0.259 0.370 0.045 0.170
291 Machinery for prod. use of mech. power 0.610 0.019 0.506 0.524 0.019 0.411 0.467 0.030 0.295
292 Other general purpose machinery 0.601 0.020 0.465 0.468 0.017 0.345 0.435 0.030 0.248
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery 0.682 0.021 0.658 0.639 0.026 0.610 0.502 0.073 0.409
294 Machine Tools 0.607 0.037 0.504 0.539 0.026 0.441 0.333 0.056 0.179
295 Other special purpose machinery 0.660 0.014 0.578 0.539 0.014 0.460 0.452 0.026 0.358
297 Domestic appliances not e/where class 0.491 0.031 0.356 0.418 0.022 0.319 0.328 0.045 0.154
311 Electric motors, generators and transform 0.524 0.024 0.380 0.468 0.018 0.360 0.414 0.028 0.250
312 Manuf. of electricity distrib, control equip 0.601 0.035 0.447 0.502 0.037 0.374 0.471 0.041 0.343
316 Electrical equipment not e/where class 0.577 0.081 0.387 0.331 0.073 0.192 0.473 0.099 0.344
321 Elect valves tubes, other elect components 0.491 0.025 0.349 0.334 0.023 0.187 0.286 0.027 0.128
322 TV radio, Telephone app. 0.711 0.085 0.581 0.543 0.062 0.542 0.412 0.074 0.224
331 Medical surgical equip, orthopedic appliances 0.647 0.056 0.512 0.561 0.047 0.407 0.409 0.054 0.277
332 Measuring, checking, testing navigating app. 0.538 0.038 0.443 0.482 0.031 0.386 0.401 0.031 0.291
333 Industrial process control equipment 0.601 0.078 0.449 0.486 0.062 0.363 0.412 0.053 0.262
342 Motor vehicles(bodies), trailers semi-trailers 0.679 0.085 0.603 0.634 0.076 0.525 0.743 0.170 0.527
343 Parts for motor vehicles and their engines 0.582 0.024 0.409 0.422 0.021 0.261 0.435 0.029 0.239
361 Furniture 0.500 0.021 0.403 0.459 0.024 0.388 0.363 0.050 0.221
366 Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.405 0.051 0.299 0.369 0.048 0.239 0.267 0.130 0.107
Mean 0.548 0.420 0.447 0.321 0.387 0.244
Median 0.553 0.409 0.459 0.332 0.400 0.235
Source: our elaboration on CMM.
600 X. Yu et al.
 at Scuola Superiore Sant?A
nna on N
ovem
ber 29, 2016
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
T
a
b
le
A
3
.
D
e
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
se
ct
o
ra
l-
le
v
e
l
la
b
o
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
g
ro
w
th
1
9
9
8
–2
0
0
2
C
IC
S
ec
to
r
P
0
le
v
el
T
o
ta
l
g
ro
w
th
W
it
h
in
%
B
et
w
ee
n
%
In
t.
%
E
x
it
%
E
n
tr
y
T
o
ta
l
G
en
u
in
e
%
G
ro
w
th
%
%
1
9
9
8
–
2
0
0
2
1
3
F
o
o
d
p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
o
f
a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
4
0
.9
0
0
.8
3
4
1
.4
3
1
3
.2
2
1
2
.0
2
9
.5
5
2
4
.9
5
2
2
.8
6
1
0
0
.0
0
1
4
O
th
er
fo
o
d
st
u
ff
3
5
.0
1
0
.7
6
3
9
.2
6
2
3
.8
8
2
4
.7
4
1
2
.4
0
1
7
.1
5
3
2
.0
5
1
0
0
.0
0
1
5
B
ev
er
a
g
es
4
9
.9
3
0
.7
3
3
8
.9
8
1
4
.0
3
2
.8
8
1
2
.1
2
1
1
.0
0
2
6
.7
5
1
0
0
.0
0
1
6
T
o
b
a
cc
o
3
1
1
.8
5
1
.0
5
7
0
.7
9
0
.4
7
4
.1
8
3
.2
5
1
.4
5
2
2
.7
6
1
0
0
.0
0
1
7
T
ex
ti
le
1
8
.7
6
0
.8
9
3
9
.1
2
1
6
.4
1
1
1
.6
8
7
.6
9
1
5
.7
3
3
2
.7
3
1
0
0
.0
0
1
8
G
a
rm
en
ts
,
fo
o
tw
ea
r,
et
c.
2
3
.4
4
0
.3
0
4
8
.5
0
1
8
.2
2
2
7
.8
4
1
4
.0
5
1
4
.6
3
3
2
.4
5
1
0
0
.0
0
1
9
L
ea
th
er
,
fu
r,
fe
a
th
er
,
et
c.
2
5
.9
9
0
.3
5
7
6
.6
5
3
3
.1
1
4
7
.7
8
6
.9
5
8
.9
6
2
2
.1
1
1
0
0
.0
0
2
0
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
o
f
ti
m
b
er
,
m
a
n
u
f.
o
f
w
o
o
d
,
b
a
m
b
o
o
2
5
.7
3
0
.7
4
3
1
.9
1
1
7
.6
7
1
8
.6
8
8
.1
9
2
8
.6
1
3
2
.3
0
1
0
0
.0
0
2
1
F
u
rn
it
u
re
3
1
.7
3
0
.3
7
7
0
.7
2
2
2
.0
1
4
6
.1
1
7
.5
9
2
0
.2
9
2
5
.4
9
1
0
0
.0
0
2
2
P
a
p
er
a
n
d
p
a
p
er
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
2
7
.3
5
1
.0
2
3
8
.3
6
1
0
.5
7
8
.7
6
8
.4
9
1
4
.3
6
3
6
.9
7
1
0
0
.0
0
2
3
P
ri
n
ti
n
g
,
re
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
o
f
re
co
rd
in
g
m
ed
ia
2
9
.8
4
1
.0
3
3
9
.7
7
1
1
.4
1
3
.7
2
9
.3
1
1
2
.8
0
3
0
.4
3
1
0
0
.0
0
2
4
A
rt
ic
le
s
fo
r
cu
lt
u
re
,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
n
d
sp
o
rt
a
ct
iv
it
y
2
5
.3
3
0
.2
2
1
1
2
.7
6
3
1
.2
5
7
7
.2
8
5
.3
7
1
1
.2
0
1
6
.7
0
1
0
0
.0
0
2
5
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
o
f
p
et
ro
le
u
m
,
co
k
er
ie
s,
n
u
cl
ea
r
fu
el
6
3
.8
3
0
.7
0
2
.3
6
1
.4
4
2
.5
4
5
.4
3
3
7
.8
1
5
3
.2
9
1
0
0
.0
0
2
6
R
a
w
ch
em
ic
a
l
m
a
te
ri
a
ls
a
n
d
ch
em
ic
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
3
0
.7
1
1
.1
8
3
3
.7
2
1
1
.3
5
3
.7
3
3
.1
6
1
7
.8
1
3
7
.6
9
1
0
0
.0
0
2
7
P
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
ti
ca
ls
4
4
.9
4
0
.9
5
4
3
.9
6
1
4
.1
7
1
2
.1
0
6
.8
1
1
2
.7
9
3
4
.3
8
1
0
0
.0
0
2
8
C
h
em
ic
a
l
fi
b
er
s
3
8
.3
9
0
.9
9
5
2
.9
2
1
3
.8
8
2
.2
2
6
.2
0
1
2
.5
0
1
6
.7
2
1
0
0
.0
0
2
9
R
u
b
b
er
2
7
.7
9
0
.9
5
4
4
.9
8
9
.4
3
6
.3
4
1
0
.1
5
9
.4
7
1
9
.6
3
1
0
0
.0
0
3
0
P
la
st
ic
s
3
5
.1
8
0
.6
3
4
2
.7
3
1
8
.2
7
2
1
.7
9
8
.8
1
1
6
.4
9
3
5
.5
0
1
0
0
.0
0
3
1
N
o
n
-m
et
a
ll
ic
m
in
er
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
2
1
.4
7
0
.7
9
4
6
.6
0
1
3
.2
2
1
2
.7
5
2
.7
9
1
8
.8
2
3
1
.3
2
1
0
0
.0
0
3
2
S
m
el
ti
n
g
a
n
d
p
re
ss
in
g
o
f
fe
rr
o
u
s
m
et
a
ls
3
4
.5
5
1
.3
1
5
3
.5
3
5
.8
3
1
.9
1
1
.4
1
1
0
.6
2
3
3
.3
4
1
0
0
.0
0
3
3
S
m
el
ti
n
g
a
n
d
p
re
ss
in
g
o
f
n
o
n
-f
er
ro
u
s
m
et
a
ls
3
1
.3
1
1
.1
1
4
1
.8
9
5
.7
4
1
.7
1
1
.0
5
2
0
.5
9
3
1
.1
2
1
0
0
.0
0
3
4
M
et
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
3
0
.8
9
0
.7
0
4
2
.9
5
1
5
.3
4
1
7
.3
2
8
.9
3
2
0
.8
2
2
9
.2
8
1
0
0
.0
0
3
5
G
en
er
a
l
p
u
rp
o
se
m
a
ch
in
er
y
2
2
.4
5
1
.2
6
4
9
.4
8
2
0
.0
0
1
6
.9
4
2
.7
5
1
2
.8
6
3
1
.8
5
1
0
0
.0
0
3
6
S
p
ec
ia
l
p
u
rp
o
se
m
a
ch
in
er
y
1
8
.3
6
1
.5
8
3
9
.6
4
1
1
.3
7
4
.7
7
0
.2
0
1
4
.9
4
2
9
.0
7
1
0
0
.0
0
3
7
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
3
5
.2
7
1
.4
7
5
3
.7
0
7
.4
8
0
.4
5
3
.4
5
1
0
.3
3
2
4
.5
8
1
0
0
.0
0
3
9
E
le
ct
ri
ca
l
m
a
ch
in
er
y
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
4
0
.4
3
0
.7
8
3
9
.1
0
1
6
.2
1
3
.1
5
6
.4
1
1
0
.1
2
3
1
.3
1
1
0
0
.0
0
4
0
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
eq
u
ip
m
en
t,
co
m
p
u
te
rs
,
et
c.
7
0
.1
0
0
.8
1
4
9
.2
3
1
8
.1
6
9
.1
8
5
.6
8
1
3
.9
9
2
2
.1
2
1
0
0
.0
0
4
1
M
ea
su
ri
n
g
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
a
n
d
m
a
ch
in
er
y
2
9
.1
0
1
.0
3
3
8
.4
5
1
6
.7
3
4
.9
5
0
.1
0
1
9
.9
6
2
9
.7
0
1
0
0
.0
0
4
2
A
rt
w
o
rk
a
n
d
o
th
er
2
2
.0
7
0
.5
3
1
0
1
.2
6
1
9
.4
0
6
2
.4
2
5
.5
1
1
2
.9
4
2
3
.3
2
1
0
0
.0
0
W
h
o
le
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
3
2
.4
7
0
.9
5
4
6
.7
7
1
2
.8
9
8
.3
6
6
.0
1
1
3
.4
8
2
9
.2
1
1
0
0
.0
0
N
o
te
:
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
sh
a
re
s
o
f
w
it
h
in
,
b
et
w
ee
n
,
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
,
ex
it
,
a
n
d
en
tr
y
ef
fe
ct
s.
L
a
b
o
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
u
n
it
:
1
0
0
0
y
u
a
n
a
t
1
9
9
8
co
n
st
a
n
t
p
ri
ce
.
So
u
rc
e:
O
u
r
el
a
b
o
ra
ti
o
n
o
n
C
M
M
.
Institutional change and productivity growth 601
 at Scuola Superiore Sant?A
nna on N
ovem
ber 29, 2016
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
T
a
b
le
A
4
.
D
e
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
se
ct
o
ra
l-
le
v
e
l
la
b
o
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
g
ro
w
th
2
0
0
2
–2
0
0
7
C
IC
S
ec
to
r
P
0
le
v
el
T
o
ta
l
g
ro
w
th
W
it
h
in
%
B
et
w
ee
n
%
In
t.
%
E
x
it
%
E
n
tr
y
T
o
ta
l
%
G
en
u
in
e
%
G
ro
w
th
%
2
0
0
2
–
2
0
0
7
1
3
F
o
o
d
p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
o
f
a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
7
5
.1
4
1
.2
1
5
0
.8
9
1
2
.9
0
2
8
.9
2
2
.9
2
3
1
.5
0
3
0
.7
1
1
0
0
.0
0
1
4
O
th
er
fo
o
d
st
u
ff
6
1
.2
7
1
.1
2
5
6
.2
8
8
.1
2
2
9
.1
7
8
.6
3
2
8
.1
6
2
7
.9
8
1
0
0
.0
0
1
5
B
ev
er
a
g
es
8
5
.9
0
1
.0
2
4
4
.5
2
1
7
.2
8
1
5
.8
7
1
0
.6
1
2
0
.8
2
2
2
.6
4
1
0
0
.0
0
1
6
T
o
b
a
cc
o
6
4
0
.5
4
1
.2
6
3
6
.3
6
4
.8
6
2
.7
3
1
4
.9
7
2
5
.7
3
1
5
.3
6
1
0
0
.0
0
1
7
T
ex
ti
le
3
4
.9
0
1
.2
0
3
9
.8
0
8
.1
3
1
1
.9
4
6
.3
8
2
6
.9
5
3
0
.6
8
1
0
0
.0
0
1
8
G
a
rm
en
ts
,
fo
o
tw
ea
r,
et
c.
3
0
.5
1
0
.8
0
9
3
.4
1
8
.9
4
6
6
.1
2
3
.5
5
2
5
.6
6
3
4
.5
7
1
0
0
.0
0
1
9
L
ea
th
er
,
fu
r,
fe
a
th
er
,
et
c.
3
4
.8
7
0
.6
1
6
5
.7
9
1
2
.8
8
3
5
.2
0
5
.0
0
2
8
.8
7
3
2
.6
5
1
0
0
.0
0
2
0
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
o
f
ti
m
b
er
,
w
o
o
d
,
b
a
m
b
o
o
,
et
c.
4
4
.9
3
1
.0
9
4
4
.2
2
0
.3
0
2
4
.7
3
4
.4
5
4
5
.8
4
3
0
.5
3
1
0
0
.0
0
2
1
F
u
rn
it
u
re
4
2
.8
5
0
.5
6
6
2
.4
6
1
1
.1
4
4
0
.8
6
3
.2
4
3
7
.9
2
3
2
.5
8
1
0
0
.0
0
2
2
P
a
p
er
a
n
d
p
a
p
er
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
5
4
.7
7
1
.4
7
3
9
.8
4
5
.2
8
6
.7
8
9
.3
3
1
9
.8
8
3
2
.4
5
1
0
0
.0
0
2
3
P
ri
n
ti
n
g
,
re
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
o
f
re
co
rd
in
g
m
ed
ia
5
7
.9
5
0
.9
1
4
4
.8
4
7
.4
4
1
6
.5
5
9
.2
5
2
1
.8
4
3
3
.1
8
1
0
0
.0
0
2
4
A
rt
ic
le
s
fo
r
cu
lt
u
re
,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
n
d
sp
o
rt
a
ct
iv
it
y
3
0
.6
6
0
.7
6
6
8
.3
3
8
.4
8
3
3
.0
7
3
.7
2
2
1
.8
5
3
0
.6
9
1
0
0
.0
0
2
5
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
o
f
p
et
ro
le
u
m
,
co
k
er
ie
s,
n
u
cl
ea
r
fu
el
1
1
1
.1
1
0
.1
5
3
3
.1
8
2
1
.3
0
7
.7
9
4
5
.5
7
4
.5
1
4
5
.8
3
1
0
0
.0
0
2
6
R
a
w
ch
em
ic
a
l
m
a
te
ri
a
ls
a
n
d
ch
em
ic
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
6
7
.9
3
1
.5
9
4
7
.0
3
8
.6
0
1
6
.1
0
5
.6
8
2
8
.4
8
2
6
.3
1
1
0
0
.0
0
2
7
P
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
ti
ca
ls
8
7
.4
9
0
.7
2
4
9
.2
4
2
1
.0
1
2
2
.2
4
9
.6
4
1
5
.5
3
2
6
.8
2
1
0
0
.0
0
2
8
C
h
em
ic
a
l
fi
b
er
s
7
5
.5
9
1
.0
5
4
6
.1
7
0
.1
4
2
4
.5
5
1
7
.2
5
2
8
.8
1
3
2
.4
7
1
0
0
.0
0
2
9
R
u
b
b
er
5
4
.2
7
0
.9
0
4
5
.2
5
7
.9
4
1
3
.7
3
1
2
.7
8
1
8
.4
3
2
9
.3
4
1
0
0
.0
0
3
0
P
la
st
ic
s
5
6
.2
0
0
.5
2
5
8
.0
7
1
3
.6
8
4
6
.8
8
1
1
.4
0
3
0
.3
4
3
3
.3
9
1
0
0
.0
0
3
1
N
o
n
–
m
et
a
ll
ic
m
in
er
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
3
7
.8
3
1
.8
7
3
6
.2
6
6
.0
7
9
.4
0
3
.5
2
3
2
.7
4
3
0
.8
0
1
0
0
.0
0
3
2
S
m
el
ti
n
g
a
n
d
p
re
ss
in
g
o
f
fe
rr
o
u
s
m
et
a
ls
8
1
.3
6
1
.5
8
6
4
.6
7
5
.8
3
1
3
.7
3
3
.8
1
2
1
.3
0
1
8
.1
3
1
0
0
.0
0
3
3
S
m
el
ti
n
g
a
n
d
p
re
ss
in
g
o
f
n
o
n
-f
er
ro
u
s
m
et
a
ls
6
5
.8
7
2
.2
6
4
6
.8
1
2
.8
8
1
4
.6
4
1
.3
0
3
4
.2
1
2
9
.4
3
1
0
0
.0
0
3
4
M
et
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
5
1
.6
4
0
.5
2
4
4
.3
1
7
.0
8
2
9
.4
0
1
0
.2
9
3
7
.7
7
2
9
.9
6
1
0
0
.0
0
3
5
G
en
er
a
l
p
u
rp
o
se
m
a
ch
in
er
y
4
9
.6
7
1
.9
4
6
8
.0
2
4
.4
6
3
5
.3
5
3
.5
6
2
6
.3
9
3
2
.9
2
1
0
0
.0
0
3
6
S
p
ec
ia
l
p
u
rp
o
se
m
a
ch
in
er
y
4
5
.3
5
2
.2
0
4
0
.0
5
4
.6
9
1
1
.9
6
4
.7
2
2
5
.4
1
3
7
.0
9
1
0
0
.0
0
3
7
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
8
7
.6
2
1
.3
5
4
4
.8
5
1
4
.7
2
1
3
.4
6
6
.8
4
2
4
.7
0
2
2
.3
5
1
0
0
.0
0
3
9
E
le
ct
ri
ca
l
m
a
ch
in
er
y
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
7
2
.2
7
0
.6
3
6
5
.8
7
1
3
.8
7
3
3
.5
4
2
.0
0
1
7
.0
5
3
4
.7
6
1
0
0
.0
0
4
0
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
eq
u
ip
m
en
t,
co
m
p
u
te
rs
,
et
c.
1
2
8
.9
1
0
.0
8
1
1
2
.7
5
3
6
.6
9
2
2
1
.2
9
1
0
4
.2
1
1
3
.4
5
1
1
8
.9
1
1
0
0
.0
0
4
1
M
ea
su
ri
n
g
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
a
n
d
m
a
ch
in
er
y
5
1
.9
4
1
.4
2
3
4
.8
6
7
.6
4
1
0
.2
7
7
.9
5
1
7
.3
6
4
2
.4
6
1
0
0
.0
0
4
2
A
rt
w
o
rk
a
n
d
o
th
er
3
3
.9
7
1
.2
0
6
0
.5
8
1
1
.5
9
4
2
.7
8
0
.9
1
2
6
.7
0
4
3
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
W
h
o
le
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
6
3
.2
7
1
.0
1
5
6
.8
1
9
.7
2
2
7
.3
9
7
.9
7
2
6
.0
4
2
6
.8
5
1
0
0
.0
0
N
o
te
:
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
sh
a
re
s
o
f
w
it
h
in
,
b
et
w
ee
n
,
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
,
ex
it
,
a
n
d
en
tr
y
ef
fe
ct
s.
L
a
b
o
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
u
n
it
:
1
0
0
0
y
u
a
n
a
t
1
9
9
8
co
n
st
a
n
t
p
ri
ce
.
So
u
rc
e:
O
u
r
el
a
b
o
ra
ti
o
n
o
n
C
M
M
.
602 X. Yu et al.
 at Scuola Superiore Sant?A
nna on N
ovem
ber 29, 2016
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
